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Introduction
On June 26, 2000, President Clinton announced on the White House lawn that a consortium of government-
funded and private sector scientists had completed a working draft of the human genome sequence,1 hailing
it as “the most important, most wondrous map ever produced.”2 Indeed, this achievement was a watershed
moment in the history of humanity, the culmination of thousands of years of man’s eﬀorts to better under-
stand himself. Several millenia ago, Aristotle postulated that “humors” accounted for variations in people’s
health and temperament, and since then, scientists have struggled relentlessly to comprehend how the human
body works. By mapping the genome, scientists have identiﬁed the basic units of individual uniqueness and
the blueprint for human development. As Francis Collins, the director of the NIH Human Genome Project,
said at the White House ceremony, “We’re here to celebrate a milestone along a truly unprecedented voyage
into ourselves... [the sequence is] a ﬁrst glimpse of the instruction book previously known only to God.”3
This announcement also marked the beginning of what is likely to be an era of unprecedented progress in
the biological sciences. The genomic sequence is not only a tremendous scientiﬁc achievement, but also a
powerful tool to drive further inquiry. The sequence will allow scientists to probe more deeply and precisely
into the workings of the human body and mind, from the predisposition for baldness to the basis of addictive
behavior. The genomic sequence will also enable the development of novel techniques to diagnose and
1The entire sequence is not yet complete; however, the “working draft” announced on this day included more than 90% of
known genes and 95% of the genes known to cause disease. The NIH Human Genome Project intends to map the entire genome
with 99.99% accuracy by 2003, and Celera Genomics has already assembled sequences from ﬁve DNA donors into a map which
encompasses 99% of the 23 human chromosomes.
2Scott Hensley & Sarah Lueck, Data Will Help Scientists Locate Speciﬁc Genes, Speed Cures for Disease, Wall St. J.,
June 27, 2000, available in 2000 WL-WSJ 3034414.
3Id.
1cure disease, from “gene chips” which identify the presence of risky genes, to gene therapies which alter or
counteract disease-causing genes. With the genome map, drug development can be much more systematic
and eﬃcient vis-` a-vis the trial-and-error methodologies used today, and the resulting drugs can target the
underlying causes of disease more speciﬁcally, rather than merely the symptoms. More generally, the genomic
sequence will empower scientists to conduct research in only a fraction of the time that it previously required.
A researcher can now “[chase] down genes at such a rate that what once took researchers years can now be
ﬁnished before lunch.”4 In sum, the genome has unleashed – and will continue to yield – knowledge that
will enable biomedical science to deliver tremendous beneﬁts to society.
Furthermore, biomedical science is advancing at a remarkable pace. According to a researcher at MIT’s
Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research, “Whole new ﬁelds of biology are opening up right now, as we
speak, and we don’t even know what they are yet.”5 It has become fairly routine to see front-page newspaper
headlines heralding scientiﬁc advances, from the identiﬁcation of a new cancer gene to the cloning of human
embryos. These innovations are not only occurring quickly, but are also pushing the limits of what was
traditionally regarded as feasible. For example, in reference to a company’s recent announcement of its
latest breakthrough, the editor-in-chief of Scientiﬁc American magazine commented, “That is an amazing
accomplishment in its own right, and like cloning, something that people once thought was impossible in
mammals.”6
4Matt Crenson, Progress Made on Human Genetic Code, AP Online, June 27, 2000, available in 2000 WL 23360202.
5Id.
6U.S. Company Says It Cloned Human Embryo for Cells, N.Y. Times.com, Nov. 25, 2001. John Rennie, the editor-in-chief
of Scientiﬁc American magazine, was reacting to the announcement by a biotechnology company (Advanced Cell Technologies)
that it had successfully prompted a human egg cell to develop into an embryo without any kind of fertilization by outside
genetic material, a process called parthenogenesis.
2The pace of biomedical advances is only likely to increase as pressure mounts on the scientiﬁc community,
not only from patients with serious illnesses, but also from investors who are banking on biotechnology as a
proﬁtable growth engine. The power of patients and their vocal advocates must not be underestimated. One
only needs to look at the inﬂuential board members and ﬁnancial coﬀers of groups such as the American
Cancer Society and Juvenile Diabetes Foundation to realize that these groups have tremendous resources
to push for further exploration of potential therapies. Patient advocacy groups also have a track record of
molding policy to advance their objectives, as evidenced by successful eﬀorts to expedite FDA review of
AIDS drugs and secure a “compassionate use” exception for terminally ill patients in experimental trials.
Commercial pressures will also push scientists and biotechnology companies to quicken the speed of biomed-
ical innovation. The ﬁnancial attractiveness of the biotechnology sector is based on the expectation that
scientists will be able to translate knowledge about the human genome into drugs and other treatments for
devastating chronic diseases.7 A study by University of Chicago researchers estimated that a cure for cancer
could be worth $47 trillion in the United States alone.8 The demographic trend of a burgeoning aging pop-
ulation further enlarges the potential market for these biotechnological products.9 Investors have therefore
been willing to inject large amounts of money into the biotechnology sector. Over 300 biotechnology compa-
nies have gone public on the stock exchange,10 and the market capitalization of the biotechnology industry
increased more than 150% between 1999 to 2000, from $138 billion to $354 billion.11 Because investors
demand high returns on their investments, they will compel scientists and biotechnology companies to push
the development of biomedical products more quickly and in the most commercially promising directions.12
7Michael Liedtke, Genome Map May Spur Biotech Interest, AP Online, June 27, 2000, available in 2000 WL 23360269.
8Id. This study was conducted by University of Chicago researchers Bob Topel and Kevin Murphy.
9Id. The World Health Organization estimates that the number of people over 65 years old will grow from 550 million in
1998 to over 1 billion in 2020.
10Id.
11Biotechnology Industry Organization, <www.bio.org/er/statistics.asp> (visited Apr. 8, 2002). Revenues of the biotechnology
industry grew from $8 billion in 1993 to $22 billion in 2000.
12Hensley & Lueck, supra note 2. For example, Celera Genomics, the company which established its reputation by competing
3Biotechnology’s commercial potential has been recognized not only in the United States, but also around
the world. A striking illustration of the high expectations for the industry is that several Asian countries
have identiﬁed biotechnology as a pillar of their economic development strategies. For example, Singapore
is investing in biomedicine to bring the country out of its worst-ever recession. Its $15 billion plan to
transform undeveloped areas of the country into a center for research and development in the life sciences
and information technology includes a research park called the Biopolis, a communication network called
the Biomedical IT grid, and a “human tissue bank” called the Singapore Tissue Network.13 Underscoring
Singapore’s “total commitment to developing its biomedical-sciences industry,”14 Singapore has also begun
wooing scientists and companies from other countries with a favorable regulatory environment and a $500
million venture capital fund. Recently, Singapore celebrated the decision by Alan Colman, a researcher from
the company that cloned Dolly the sheep, to move to Singapore.15
Other Asian countries are betting on biotechnology as well. China has established a national fund to support
domestic research and import foreign scientists with expertise: “[S]ome in Beijing hope the biotech revolution
will provide China with what Sputnik gave the Soviet Union: an entr´ ee into the ranks of scientiﬁcally
advanced nations – but with an even bigger commercial payout. For now, its rapid gains in the ﬁeld are
likely at least to give it a prominent voice in shaping global biotech policies.”16 Taiwan has also announced
plans to boost its biotechnology sector as part of an economic strategy to focus on higher value industries,
such as biotechnology and information technology, rather than lower and middle value industries which have
become increasingly competitive.17 According to its Biotech Industry Development Master Plan, Taiwan
with the NIH to map the human genome, is under pressure to show that it has a long-term business plan beyond its ability to
quickly sequence human and animal genomes.
13Tan Ooi Boon, Singapore Seeks Biomedical Tie-ups with European Players, Singapore Straits Times, Mar. 2, 2002,
available in 2002 WL 4328156.
14Id. Statement by Philip Yeo, chairman of Singapore’s Agency for Science Technology and Research and co-chairman of the
Economic Development Board.
15Alexa Olesen, Sheep Cloning Scientist to Move, AP Online, Mar. 6, 2002, available in 2002 WL 16386858.
16Karby Leggett and Antonio Regalado, Fertile Ground: As West Mulls Ethics, China Forges Ahead in Stem Cell Research,
Wall St. J., Mar. 6, 2002, at A1, available in 2002 WL-WSJ 3387799.
17Genetic Variations Next Trend in Bioindustry, China Post, Mar. 2, 2002, available in 2002 WL 5755835.
4will invest $500 million over the next ﬁve years, aiming to create 500 biotechnology companies over the next
10 years and grow industry revenue by 25% each year. Korea has also announced its intention to establish
an institute to support the biotechnology industry as well as a fund to invest in biotechnology companies.18
Beyond the therapeutic and commercial beneﬁts it will yield, biotechnology will have a signiﬁcant impact
on society itself. As Nobel Laureate and Cal Tech president David Baltimore predicts, “Biology will become
an engine of transformation of our society. Instead of guessing about how we diﬀer from one from another,
we will understand and be able to tailor our life experiences to our inheritance. We will also be able, to
some extent, to control that inheritance.”19 Biomedical progress therefore prompts profound questions about
whether science’s potential social implications warrant restrictions on scientiﬁc manipulation. As one author
suggests, “cloning is perhaps the most ethically, morally and legally consequential scientiﬁc discovery of
mankind since the invention of nuclear weapons.”20
Like many other technological advances, biotechnology is a double-edged sword. It can be applied for
unquestionably beneﬁcial purposes as well as unequivocally harmful ones, with many potential applications
falling into a “gray zone” between these extremes. As described by
political and social theorist Francis Fukuyama:
Biotechnology falls somewhere between... technologies which absolutely require regulation, such as
nuclear technology, and technologies which are relatively benign, such as the personal computer.
Transgenic crops and human genetic engineering make people far more uneasy than do personal
computers or the Internet. But biotechnology also promises important beneﬁts for human health
and well-being. When presented with an advance like the ability to cure cystic ﬁbrosis or diabetes,
it is hard for people to articulate reasons why their unease with the technology should stand in the
way of progress.21
18Korean Government to Strengthen Support for Biotech Industry, Asia Pulse, June 27, 2000, available in 2000 WL 20935966.
19Ralph Brave, Governing the Genome: Which Genetic Modiﬁcations Should Be Encouraged and Which Outlawed? Deep
Divisions Exist Even Among Ethical Scientists and Informed Activists, The Nation, Vol. 273, Issue 19, Dec. 10, 2001, available
in 2001 WL 2133084.
20Paul Tully, Dollywood Is Not Just a Theme Park in Tennessee Anymore: Unwarranted Prohibitory Human Cloning
Legislation and Policy Guidelines for a Regulatory Approach to Cloning, 31 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1385, 1386 (1998).
5Not surprisingly, concerns about biotechnology have begun to assume a higher proﬁle in public discourse.
Stories about the human genome, cloning, and stem cells have graced newsmagazine covers, paraded in
newspaper headlines, and dominated television talk show debates. Congress has considered legislation on a
variety of biotechnology-related topics, from genetic privacy to transgenic crops. President Bush’s nationally
televised, prime time address devoted to stem cell policy reﬂects a priority on biotechnology issues which
may be a harbinger of the future. As Arthur Caplan, a noted bioethicist and director of the Center for
Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania, commented, “Bioethics probably has topped the chart of its
visibility when the president makes his ﬁrst speech on bioethics and appoints his bioethics advisor. I guess
that’s bigger than I would have guessed we would get.”22
Determining whether and how to regulate biotechnology will be extremely diﬃcult, however. Many of the
questions that biotechnology raises are ones on which reasonable people can, and do, diﬀer. As Caplan asks,
“That map over there [of the human genome] is going to generate more stuﬀ. Are we going to test people’s
genes in the workplace? Are we going to engineer people to be stronger, faster, better? Are we going to
try and tweak those genes to live forever?”23 The answers to these questions hinge on deeply held moral,
religious, and socially-constructed values which people hold in a wide – and often irreconcilably arrayed –
range of permutations. As one author notes, “We live, after all, in a pluralistic society where uniformity of
opinion is virtually impossible.”24
Given the diﬃculty of resolving these value-laden debates, there is a tendency to defer to the rationality
22Bill Bergstrom, Bioethicists Address ‘Deep Questions’ Debate: Such Complex Issues as Cloning, Genome Mapping and
Stem Cell Research Have Pushed the Formerly Obscure Field into Prominence, L.A. Times, Sept. 30, 2001, at A27, available
in 2001 WL 2521991.
23Id.
24Charity Scott, Why Law Pervades Medicine: An Essay on Ethics in Health Care, 14 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub.
Pol’y 245, 258 (2000).
6of science. During the 2001 Congressional cloning debate, Representative Strickland (D-OH) argued that
policy should be guided by the best available science and that “we should not allow theology, philosophy,
or politics to interfere with the decision we make on this issue.”25 Fukuyama notes the post-Enlightenment
phenomenon that the public often tends to trust scientists more than politicians:
Eﬀorts by politicians to limit what scientists do in their own domain evoke memories of the medieval
Catholic Church branding Galileo a heretic for saying the earth revolves around the sun. Since the
time of Francis Bacon, the pursuit of scientiﬁc research has been seen to carry its own legitimacy as
an activity that serves the broader interests of mankind.26
Bioethical dilemmas are further complicated by an immense degree of uncertainty about the future of sci-
entiﬁc discovery. It is impossible to predict how extensive or limited the potential for genetic alteration will
be. On one hand, nature may foil scientists’ best eﬀorts to control the genome, thereby obviating some
of the most vexing fears about biotechnology. For example, if the genes for traits such as intelligence and
athletic prowess prove to be too complicated for scientists to pinpoint, the prospect that parents will demand
“designer babies” will never materialize. On the other hand, there may be no limits to biomedical progress,
with the only real question being how quickly this progress will unfold. In this case, the bioethical questions
which society is currently facing will be only the beginning of more extensive discussions that may even have
to contemplate “the end of the human species as such.”27 Perhaps Francis Fukuyama’s eerie conception of
a “post-human future” is not an impossible one:
25Fukuyama, supra note 21.
27Id.
7Ultimately, the technologies developed by these companies, as well as by researchers in government
and academia, may lead us into a post-human future in which we have the capacity, slowly but
surely, to alter the essence of human nature. Many embrace this power under the banner of human
freedom... the freedom of parents to choose the kind of children they have, the freedom of scientists
to pursue research, and the freedom of entrepreneurs to make use of the new technologies to create
wealth. But this kind of freedom will be diﬀerent from all other freedoms that people have previously
enjoyed... we will deliberately take charge of our own biological makeup rather than leaving it to the
blind forces of natural selection... Many assume that the post-human world will look pretty much
like our own – free, equal, prosperous, caring, compassionate – only with better health care, longer
lives, and perhaps higher levels of intelligence than today.
But the post-human world could be one that is far more hierarchical and competitive than
the one that currently exists, and full of social conﬂict as a result. It could be one in which any
notion of shared humanity is lost, because we have mixed human genes with those of so many other
species that we no longer have a clear idea of what a human being is. It could be one in which the
average person is living well into his or her second century, sitting in a nursing home hoping for
an unattainable death. Or it could be the kind of soft tyranny envisioned in Brave New World, in
which everyone is healthy and happy but has forgotten the meaning of hope, fear, or struggle.”28
Fortunately, it is widely accepted that consideration of bioethical issues is crucial; however, the current
condition of bioethics policy in the United States is deeply unsatisfactory. There are few clear bioethical
guidelines or regulations, and even where regulations have been issued, their eﬀectiveness is dubious. As one
author describes:
[T]he state of human cloning regulation in the United States is one of uncertainty, and even confusion.
Moratoria were declared, but they did not have a discernible policy eﬀect. State laws have been
passed, but oﬀer limited assurance against human cloning. The private sector, left free of regulation,
has been asked to voluntarily comply. The FDA has asserted jurisdiction, although the agency may
not have the authority or the resources to deal with the controversial issue.29
Undoubtedly, one major reason that clearer standards have not been established is that it is extremely
challenging to reach consensus on these issues. While many valuable discussions have taken place, they have
been waged within separate silos, e.g., biotechnology companies, religious institutions, universities, think
tanks, non-governmental organizations. Stark diﬀerences in interests, perspectives, and vocabularies make
it diﬃcult for these silos to talk to each other. As one author notes:
8... I would like to call attention to one feature of that discussion, a feature that will make it very
diﬃcult for our legislatures and for our courts to arrive at a cloning policy that will be acceptable to
more than a handful or two of the participants in that discussion. The feature that I have in mind
is the deep diversity that exists among the discussants, a diversity so deep that on several points it
will not only be diﬃcult for them to reach agreement; it will also be diﬃcult for them to understand
each other at all.30
Another problem with bioethical discussion in the United States is that it has not been as transparent to the
general public as would be desirable. Although deliberative bodies such as the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission (NBAC) held extensive public hearings and solicited comments from all interested parties, the
public must have more than just the opportunity to participate in these discussions. It must also have
suﬃcient information to participate meaningfully in them. Unfortunately, one writer’s description of the
current situation may be accurate:
Deliberative democracy, viewed as but a complement to the legislative process, is an attractive idea.
The principal drawback to its eﬀective implementation is that the average, ordinary, reasonable
American is not suﬃciently informed to enter into meaningful discourse on the ramiﬁcations of the
new Age of Biotechnology. Logic is too often put on “hold” while emotional feelings control and
often resolve the debate.31
The unsatisfactory state of bioethics today threatens to become increasingly problematic as scientiﬁc ad-
vances raise more and more bioethical dilemmas. Somehow, the current policy deadlock must be broken.
Because bioethical issues are so controversial and perhaps even objectively indeterminate,32 it may be neces-
sary, as a ﬁrst matter, to determine what kind of process could facilitate the adequate resolution of bioethical
dilemmas. The “how” of bioethics policy must be established before it is possible to discuss what the correct
– or at least the most plausible33 – bioethical policies may be. A policy development process which system-
atically encourages and incorporates a wide range of perspectives is more likely to reach the “right answers”
– i.e., policies which endure over time, satisfy the broadest range of groups in a heterogeneous society, and
32Id. at 98. “An overriding concern of any study of applied bioethics over the years to come is the extent to which diverse
notions about ethics and bioethics will be reconciled.”
33Scott, supra note 24, at 258: “What is meant by ‘consensus’ is less than unanimity and more a sense of general agreement.
Whether a bare majority or a substantial majority, ‘consensus’... means a democratic resolution we have agreed to abide by in
our social contract, even if individually some (or even many) of us believe a particular resolution is wrong.”
9are respected and followed by those who must abide by them. In contrast, an imperfect process is likely to
yield policies which are divisive and which may be slowly but steadily undermined by those who disagree
with them or the way they were derived.
The American democratic process has proven to be a suitable forum for debating and deciding diﬃcult
issues with signiﬁcant societal implications; however, the democratic process sometimes needs assistance to
function properly, and knotty bioethical issues present one such context. This paper therefore considers the
type of process which could facilitate the resolution of bioethical dilemmas. This discussion has been divided
into four sections:
I.
Overview of Eﬀorts to Craft Bioethical Standards and Policies
II.
Why Bioethical Standards Are Particularly Important for Modern Biotechnology
III.
Consideration of Diﬀerent Decision Making Options
IV.
A Proposal for an Institution Dedicated to the Development and Implementation of Bioethics Policy
1011Section I: Overview of Eﬀorts to Craft Bioethical Standards and Policies
There has been no dearth of bioethical discussion in the United States. In fact, there has been a tremendous
amount of debate, and a multitude of parties – from the private sector to the federal government, from
think tanks to universities – have undertaken eﬀorts to articulate bioethical standards and policies. As the
following overview indicates, however, few widely accepted principles have emerged, and only a handful of
regulations have been placed in force.
The private sector
In recognition of the ethical implications of their work, biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies have
begun to establish relationships with bioethicists. Caplan even asserts that bioethicists have become as
essential to biotechnology companies as more traditional advisers such as lawyers and accountants.34 While
it is heartening that private companies have taken the initiative to conduct business in a bioethically re-
sponsible way, a skeptic could reasonably question whether bioethicists can provide meaningful guidance to
companies which pay them for their advice.35
Indeed, the relationships between companies and “bioethicists-on-retainer” have raised many eyebrows.
Pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies have established many types of arrangements with bioethicists,
ranging from consulting agreements with individual bioethicists and appointments to advisory boards,36 to
in-house bioethics panels and bioethics centers at universities.37 Since private sector companies oﬀer large
34Bruce Sylvester, In-house Ethics Czars Seen as Vital in Age of Stem Cells, Cloning, Biotechnology Newswatch, Oct.
1, 2001, available in 2001 WL 8787967.
35Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bioethicists Fall Under Familiar Scrutiny, N.Y. Times.com, Aug. 1, 2001.
36Carl Elliott, Pharma Buys a Conscience, American Prospect, Vol. 12, Issue 17, Sept. 24, 2001, available in 2001 WL
7681208. The advisory boards of major biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies are littered with the names of leading
bioethicists, e.g., Nancy Dubler of Monteﬁore Medical (DNA Sciences); Ronald Green of Dartmouth University (Advanced Cell
Technology); Arthur Caplan of the University of Pennsylvania (Celera Genomics, DuPont); Karen Lebacqz of the Paciﬁc School
of Religion (Geron Corporation); Evan DeRenzo (Janssen Pharmaceuticals).
37Id. Industry-university relationships include SmithKline Beecham’s sponsorship of the genetics program at the Stanford
University Center for Biomedical Ethics; Merck Company Foundation’s ﬁnancing of several international ethics centers (e.g., in
Ankara, Turkey and Pretoria, South Africa); Aventis Pharmaceuticals Foundation’s funding of the Research Integrity Project
12sums of money to bioethicists and their aﬃliated institutions, there are concerns that bioethicists’ judgments
may be inﬂuenced by ﬁnancial considerations. The bioethics community has not established any guidelines
for appropriate ﬁnancial arrangements with private sector companies, so companies currently have wide
latitude to exercise their ﬁnancial clout to ﬁnd friendly and amenable bioethicists. As described by the em-
inent ethicist and philosopher Dr. Daniel Callahan, “This is a semiscandalous situation for my ﬁeld. These
companies are smart enough to know that there are a variety of views on these subjects, and with a little
bit of asking or shopping around you can ﬁnd a group that will be congenial to what you are doing.”38
A recent incident shows how companies may condition their ﬁnancial support on favorable opinions. In 2000,
the Hastings Center, an institute for bioethics research and education,39 lost an annual $25,000 grant from
the pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly after the Center published an article by a writer who was critical of
Lilly’s blockbuster anti-depressant drug, Prozac. Although Lilly denies that the article’s publication was
the reason for the withdrawal of the grant, the sequence of events is suspicious, especially since the writer’s
appointment at the University of Toronto’s Center for Addiction and Mental Health, which also received a
gift from Eli Lilly, was rescinded after he gave a talk which raised concerns about Prozac.40 As one writer
describes, corporations can exert inﬂuence over the bioethicists they sponsor, even without outright pressure:
“Corporate money is so crucial to the way that university medical centers are funded today that no threats
or oﬀers need actually be made in order for a company to exert its inﬂuence. The mere presence of corporate
money is enough.”41
The situation is exacerbated by the lack of credentialing standards for bioethicists. As R. Alta Charo, a
at the Midwest Bioethics Center.
38Stolberg, supra note 35.
39The salience of bioethics issues has prompted the formation of many think tanks like The Hastings Center. The Hastings
Center is a well established and highly regarded think tank devoted to the interdisciplinary study of bioethical issues. Founded
in 1969 in Garrison, New York, it was the ﬁrst institute devoted to the study of ethical issues in medicine and has considered a
wide range of questions, from the right to die and distribution of scarce organ transplants, to informed consent and surrogate
parenting. See The Hastings Center website <www.thehastingscenter.org> (visited Apr. 8, 2002).
40Elliott, supra note 36.
41Id.
13professor of law and medical ethics at the University of Wisconsin, commented, “Anybody can stand up and
claim to be an ethicist; there is no licensing, there is no accreditation.”42 Reﬂecting the multidisciplinary
nature of the discipline, the current ranks of bioethicists comprise many types of professionals, including
doctors, nurses, theologians, lawyers, and anthropologists. Not all bioethicists have had medical or scientiﬁc
training, but most have had experience on hospital ethics panels or university research review boards. As
a growing number of universities establish bioethics graduate programs, the corps of bioethicists will be-
gin to include more people with speciﬁc academic training in the ﬁeld. The heterogeneity of bioethicists’
backgrounds is not necessarily problematic; in fact, it is probably fortunate. At the same time, one can legit-
imately wonder whether the self-appointed bioethicists who are called on to make important value judgments
are suﬃciently qualiﬁed to do so. In the strong words of one critic, “The bioethicists have set themselves
up, almost like Napoleon crowning himself emperor, as the arbiters of what is moral and ethical in health
care... [and even a] hairdresser has to have a license.”43
Furthermore, bioethicists seem to have little to no accountability for their decisions. For example, when the
Jones Institute for Reproductive Medicine drew broad criticism for its experiments with human embryos,
the Institute retorted that its protocols had been cleared by three separate ethics panels. The Institute
refused to name its ethicists, however, claiming that “[w]hen people signed on to participate in the ethics
review, that was not with the understanding that their names would be made public. That wasn’t part of
the deal.”44 Where open disclosure should be the norm, it is disconcerting that bioethicists could ask for
and receive protection of their identities.
Taken together, all of these factors – the ﬁnancial leverage that private companies have over bioethicists
42Stolberg, supra note 35.
43Id., quoting Wesley J. Smith, author of Culture of Death: The Assault on Medical Ethics in America (Encounter
Books, 2000).
44Id.
14and their institutions, the lack of minimum qualiﬁcations for bioethicists, and the dearth of accountability
– have fueled charges that bioethicists are being used as ﬁg leaves for controversial projects. According to
one theologian, “Bioethicists don’t realize it, but they are the pawns in this whole debate.”45 Similarly, Carl
Elliott, a bioethicist at the University of Minnesota, warns:
Bioethics boards look like watchdogs, but they are used like show dogs. What better way for a
corporation to polish its image than to parade an ethics consultant before its critics? What better
way to head oﬀ litigation than to run its plans by an in-house ethics board? No matter how
outrageous a corporate policy, no matter how troubling a headline in the morning paper, it will
be softened by the knowledge that the corporation in question has consulted with a team of ethics
experts. Better to buy a bioethicist now than to be attacked by one later. The only challenge is
how to disguise the job so that bioethicists do not realize they have been bought?46
Because bioethics is an inherently subjective inquiry, it is diﬃcult to prove whether bioethicists are in fact
inﬂuenced by the companies which pay them. The diversity of moral, political, and intellectual perspectives
generates a large universe of potentially “correct” opinions. Since it is impossible to “audit” bioethicists for
objectivity, the ﬁnancial relationships between bioethicists and private industry inevitably raise questions
about the credibility of these bioethicists’ decisions. As Elliott describes:
The point is that certain people in whom public trust is placed... must be ﬁnancially disinterested.
What is more, they must be seen as disinterested; otherwise, the institution they represent risks
falling apart... Part of the problem is aesthetic. It is unseemly for ethicists to share in the proﬁts
of [companies which may engage in unethical practices.] But credibility also is an issue. How can
bioethicists continue to be taken seriously if they are on the payroll of the very corporations whose
practices they are expected to assess?47
In light of these perceived – or actual – conﬂicts of interest, it is unlikely that private companies’ consultations
with bioethicists can be a reliable source of compelling bioethical guidelines.
Federal government – Executive Branch
45Id., quoting Nigel M. de S. Cameron.
15Several eﬀorts to study and address bioethical issues have been undertaken by the President and Executive
agencies, and these eﬀorts have made valuable contributions to the deeper understanding of these issues. For
example, the dozens of public hearings held by the National Bioethics Advisory Council (NBAC) yielded a
rich corpus of background information48 which will serve as a resource for future bioethical debates. Few
concrete, lasting bioethics policies have emerged from these Executive Branch initiatives, however. Many
of these initiatives were designed to be primarily deliberative, with no enactment or enforcement powers
conferred to the institutions they established. Also, many of these initiatives were created for a limited
period of time to address a speciﬁc set of issues. As the following overview shows, the Executive Branch
can play an important role in bioethical discussion; however, it may not be the ideal place to plant principal
responsibility for making policy.
•
The National Bioethics Advisory Council (NBAC)
Although previous administrations addressed bioethical issues,49 it is appropriate to begin a survey of Pres-
idential initiatives during the genetics era with the National Bioethics Advisory Council (NBAC). President
Clinton established the NBAC by Executive Order50 in October 1995 to serve as an advisory body to the
National Science and Technology Council, a group of Cabinet-level oﬃcials chaired by President Clinton.
The NBAC was composed of 17 members appointed by President Clinton,51 and it was established for a
48A compilation of NBAC documents is available at <http://bioethics.georgetown/edu/nbac/pubs.html> (visited Apr. 8,
2002). The topics that NBAC considered included human cloning, research involving persons with mental disorders, research
with human biological materials, stem cell research, and clinical trials in developing countries.
49E.g., at President Carter’s request, Congress established the Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research in 1978. In 1982, the Commission disbanded after issuing reports on 10 pressing
issues: the deﬁnition of death, informed consent, genetic screening and counseling, disparities in the availability of health care,
life-sustaining treatment, privacy and conﬁdentiality, genetic engineering, compensation for injured subjects, whistleblowing in
research, and the IRB guidebook.
50Exec. Order No. 12,975, 60 Fed. Reg. 193 (1995).
51The members were Dr. Harold Shapiro, President of Princeton University; Dr. Patricia Backlar, Research Professor
of Bioethics at Portland State University and Assistant Director of the Center for Ethics in Health Care at Oregon Health
Sciences University; Dr. Arturo Brito, Assistant Professor of Clinical Pediatrics at University of Miami; Alexander Capron,
Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Paciﬁc Center for Health Policy and Ethics at University of Southern California Law
16period of two years, although it was reauthorized several times. NBAC’s mandate was to identify broad
ethical principles, rather than to review and approve speciﬁc projects.52 Substantively, NBAC’s priority was
to consider how to safeguard the rights and welfare of human research subjects, since the primary impetus
for establishing NBAC had been concerns that volunteers in clinical studies were not receiving suﬃcient in-
formation about the risks of participating in research trials.53 Only as a second priority was NBAC expected
to tackle other bioethical questions.54
This second priority assumed a much higher proﬁle, however, when Scottish scientists announced in Febru-
ary 1997 that they had successfully cloned a sheep named Dolly. The cloning of Dolly through a procedure
called nuclear transfer55 represented a signiﬁcant scientiﬁc step beyond cloning techniques which were avail-
able at that time, and the procedure raised the realistic possibility that human cloning could be feasible in
the future. In response, President Clinton announced a moratorium on the use of federal funds for human
cloning research and directed the NBAC to consider the implications of human cloning research and make
appropriate recommendations within 90 days. In its report, the NBAC concluded that the early stages of
cloning technology made human research too risky and that moral qualms outweighed cloning’s practical
Center; Dr. Eric Cassell, Professor of Public Health at Cornell Medical College; R. Alta Charo, Professor of Law and Medical
Ethics at University of Wisconsin; Dr. James Childress, Professor of Religious Studies and Medical Education at University
of Virginia and Co-Director of Virginia Health Policy Center; Dr. David Cox, Scientiﬁc Director of Perlegen Sciences; Dr.
Rhetaugh Dumas, Vice Provost Emerita and Dean Emerita and Professor of Nursing at University of Michigan; Dr. Carol
Greider, Professor of Molecular Biology and Genetics at Johns Hopkins University; Steven Holtzman, Chief Business Oﬃcer of
Millennium Pharmaceuticals; Bette Kramer, Founding President of Richmond Bioethics Consortium; Dr. Bernard Lo, Director
of Program in Medical Ethics at University of California in San Francisco; Dr. Lawrence H. Miike, M.D., J.D.; Dr. Thomas
Murray, President of the Hastings Center; William Oldaker, Senior Parner, Oldaker and Harris, LLP and Co-Founder and
General Counsel, NeuralStem Biopharmaceuticals; Dr. Diane Scott-Jones, Professor of Psychology at Boston College.
52Exec. Order No. 12,975, supra note 50, §§ 4(b) and 4(c).
53Exec. Order No. 12,975, supra note 50, § 5(a), reads as follows: “As a ﬁrst priority, NBAC shall direct its attention to
consideration of: protection of the rights and welfare of human research subjects; and issues in the management and use of
genetic information, including but not limited to, human gene patenting.”
54Exec. Order No. 12,975, supra note 50, § 5(b) provides that NBAC should consider four criteria in establishing its priorities
other than those enumerated in § 5(a): the public health or public policy urgency of the bioethical issue; the relation of the
bioethical issue to the goals of federal investments in science and technology; absence of another entity capable of considering
the issue appropriately; the extent of interest in the issue within the federal government. § 4(d) further provides that NBAC can
accept suggestions for topics to consider not only from the National Science and Technology Council, but also from Congress
and the public. NBAC itself can also identify issues that it would like to examine, subject to approval by the National Science
and Technology Council.
55In nuclear transfer cloning, the nucleus of a female egg cell is removed and replaced by the nucleus of a somatic cell. The
DNA from the somatic cell becomes the genetic basis of the organism which develops from the egg cell and is therefore an
asexually-produced, identical genetic copy of the somatic cell donor.
17value at that time. NBAC recommended that the moratorium on federally funded human cloning research
be maintained and urged Congress to pass legislation to prohibit cloning, but with a sunset provision which
would allow Congress to revisit cloning policy in the future. 56 President Clinton submitted legislation to
Congress based on these recommendations, but Congress failed to enact it.
Following the 1998 announcement that University of Wisconsin researchers had isolated human embryonic
stem cells, NBAC also considered the ethics of stem cell research. After extensive study, it issued a report
in 199957 which concluded that federal funding for stem cell research should be limited to research involving
speciﬁc types of stem cells. It outlined a monitoring mechanism, including a National Stem Cell Oversight
and Review Panel, to ensure that these restrictions would be heeded, and it urged the private sector to
voluntarily comply with these restrictions as well. These recommendations were inﬂuential in the NIH’s
development of guidelines for federal funding of embryonic stem cell research.58
•
The Council on Bioethics
According to the terms of the Executive Order that created it, NBAC expired in October 2001. Having
highlighted his opposition to the Clinton administration’s stem cell policy during the 2000 election campaign,
President Bush announced upon assuming oﬃce that his administration would revisit the NIH guidelines for
federally funded stem cell research. Ultimately, the guidelines were revised to allow the continuing use of
56NBAC was also explicit about urging that the ban be phrased carefully to allow other valuable areas of scientiﬁc research,
including cell line cloning, to continue.
57Ethical Issues in Human Stem Cell Research (National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Rockville, MD), Sept. 1999,
available in <http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/nbac> (visited Apr. 8, 2002).
58These guidelines permitted federal funds to be used for human embryonic stem cell research, but only with discarded human
embryos. The intentional creation of embryos for such research was forbidden.
18federal funds for stem cell research, but only with stem cells which had been created before August 2000.59
Along with this announcement of the new stem cell policy, President Bush indicated that he would appoint
a Council on Bioethics (“Council”).60 The Council’s mandate is very broad. Although speciﬁc issues, such
as embryonic stem cell research, assisted reproduction, and cloning, are mentioned in its charter, the Council
is also empowered to study broader issues not tied to speciﬁc technologies, such as the appropriate uses of
biomedical technologies and the consequences of limiting scientiﬁc research.61 Like NBAC, the Council is
expected to consider bioethical issues in general terms; it is not empowered to review speciﬁc projects or
develop regulations.62 The charter further indicates that the Council should not feel pressured to achieve
consensus. Rather, it should be “guided by the need to articulate fully the complex and often competing
moral positions on any given issue... The Council may therefore choose to proceed by oﬀering a variety of
views on a particular issue, rather than attempt to reach a single consensus position.”63
The 17 members of the Council were appointed by President Bush and include prominent academics from
a wide range of disciplines and one journalist.64 The Council assembled for the ﬁrst time in January 2002
and began its deliberations with issues related to human cloning. In particular, it has been charged with
59It is believed that over 60 of these cell lines are available at 11 diﬀerent academic and private laboratories in the United
States and around the world; however, it is still unclear how many viable stem cell lines will actually be available to researchers
because the cell lines have not yet been fully characterized.
60Exec. Order No. 13,237 (Nov. 28, 2001). Like NBAC, the Council will terminate within 2 years unless extended by the
President prior to its expiration. § 5(b).
61Exec. Order No. 13,237, supra note 60, § 2(b).
62Exec. Order No. 13,237, supra note 60, § 2(d).
63Exec. Order No. 13,237, supra note 60, § 2(c).
64Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush’s Advisers on Ethics Discuss Human Cloning, N.Y. Times.com, Jan. 18, 2002. Members
include Dr. Leon Kass (chairman), professor of bioethics at University of Chicago; Dr. Elizabeth Blackburn, professor of
biochemistry and biophysics at University of California at San Francisco; Dr. Stephen Carter, law professor at Yale University;
Dr. Rebecca Dresser, law professor at Washington University; Dr. Daniel Foster, chairman of internal medicine at University
of Texas Southwestern Medical School; Dr. Francis Fukuyama, professor of international political economy at Johns Hopkins
University; Dr. Michael Gazzaniga, director of Center for Cognitive Neuroscience at Dartmouth College; Dr. Robert P. George,
professor of jurisprudence at Princeton University; Dr. Alfonso Gomez-Lobo, professor of metaphysics and moral philosophy
at Georgetown University; Dr. Mary Ann Glendon, law professor at Harvard University; Dr. William Hurlbut, professor of
human biology at Stanford University; Mr. Charles Krauthammer, columnist for the Washington Post; Dr. William F. May,
emeritus professor of ethics at Southern Methodist University; Dr. Paul McHugh, director of the department of psychiatry and
behavioral sciences at Johns Hopkins University; Dr. Gilbert Meilaender, professor of Christian ethics at Valparaiso University;
Dr. Janet Rowley, professor of medicine, molecular genetics and cell biology, and human genetics at the University of Chicago;
Dr. Michael Sandel, professor of government at Harvard University; Dr. James Q. Wilson, emeritus professor of management
and public policy at University of California at Los Angeles.
19considering two questions: whether cloning should be used to produce babies which are genetically identical
replicas of a parent (“reproductive cloning”) and whether scientists should clone embryos to obtain cells for
the treatment of disease (“therapeutic cloning”).
Given its recent formation, the Council has not yet issued any ﬁndings or reports, and it has not indicated
when it expects to do so. Although judgment must be reserved until the Council has had a chance to act,
many critics have expressed concerns that the Council is insuﬃciently inclusive and ideologically slanted.
Patient advocates have noted that the Council lacks any representatives of the chronically ill, who could
signiﬁcantly beneﬁt from cloning technology. Other critics have pointed out that 14 of the 17 members
are men and that most members are white.65 The chairman of the Council and President Bush’s personal
bioethics adviser, Dr. Leon Kass, is well-known for his strong opposition to cloning;66 moreover, President
Bush’s remarks to the Council at its ﬁrst meeting seem to presume a conservative bias. Exhorting the
Council to “be the conscience of the country,” he indicated that he viewed the role of the Council as helping
people “come to grips with how medicine and science interface... [with]... the dignity of life, and the notion
that life is – you know, that there is a Creator.”67 Most recently, President Bush evinced his position even
more explicitly by inviting opponents of cloning research to the White House to rally support for pending
legislation in the Senate which would ban both reproductive and therapeutic cloning.68
•
Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC)
The Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) was established in October 1974 by the Department
of Health, Education & Welfare69 in response to the advent of DNA splicing technology. This technology,
65Id.
66Id.
67Id.
68Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Rallies Opponents of Cloning, N.Y. Times.com, Apr. 10, 2002.
69This Department is now known as the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
20which enables gene transfer, emerged in 1973 when Stanford scientists successfully inserted DNA from a
simian cancer virus into E. coli, a bacteria which lives in human intestines. Fellow scientists were concerned
about the technique and called for the suspension of further experimentation until safety could be assured.
In February 1975, the National Academy of Sciences convened a group of scientists, lawyers, and journalists
to consider the implications of and proper response to gene splicing technology. Although a primary purpose
of the conference was to alleviate widespread fears about the technology, the Conference ended up being a
public relations disaster. Even the journalists who attended the Conference walked away worrying whether
scientists would create a lethal “Andromeda Strain.”
Amid intense public pressure, the RAC drew up strict regulations for gene transfer experiments. All gene
transfer protocols were required to obtain RAC approval, and the RAC subjected these protocols to exhaus-
tive review. For example, the RAC drafted a set of over 100 questions which addressed the scientiﬁc merits,
ethical propriety, and public safety consequences of gene therapy research. Researchers had to answer these
questions in hearings which were open to the public, and institutions conducting RAC-approved, federally
funded research were required to establish an Institutional Biohazard Committee (IBC) to supervise genetic
research locally and ensure compliance with RAC regulations.70
Over time, public alarm about gene transfer technology subsided. By the 1980s, patient advocates even
began to criticize the RAC review process as too slow and argued that it was hampering the development of
therapies for AIDS, cancer, and other deadly diseases.71 The RAC met only 3 times per year and thus could
not quickly address the growing number of protocols coming before it. Bowing to pressure, the RAC assessed
its regulatory role and crafted a revised process that decreased its role. The RAC ceded routine oversight
of gene transfer experiments to the FDA, while retaining the authority to conduct more detailed review of
protocols which used novel methods or raised new policy issues. As the FDA assumed more responsibility for
70Joseph M. Rainsbury, Biotechnology on the RAC – FDA/NIH Regulation of Human Gene Therapy. 55 Food & Drug
L.J. 575, 581 (2000).
71Id. at 583.
21gene therapy regulation, the nature of the regulatory oversight changed; namely, it become less normative
and more technical. Whereas the RAC had raised many ethical and public safety questions, the FDA focused
on matters such as pre-clinical safety data and long-term monitoring of the health of research participants.72
Eventually, the RAC’s role had diminished so much that NIH Director Harold Varmus proposed to shrink
the RAC. Its membership was decreased from 25 to 15, and its authority over novel gene therapy protocols
was essentially dismantled. Although researchers must still respond to RAC questions, the RAC no longer
has any decisive power; it can only advise the FDA. In essence, the RAC has become a deliberative body,
or as one commentator ruefully described, “a debating society” for controversial gene therapy protocols. At
a workshop conducted on the 25th anniversary of the establishment of the RAC, scientists and regulators
concluded that the RAC could no longer eﬀectively oversee the biotechnology industry.73
Although the RAC has little impact today, many acknowledge that it played a key role in the appropriate
introduction and current acceptance of gene therapy:
Despite recent controversy, federal oversight of the commencement of human gene therapy clinical
trials represents a regulatory success story. In a culture frequently mistrustful of biotechnology
advances, gene therapy has provided an open forum for intelligent deliberation about the risks and
beneﬁts of gene therapy. A key component to this success has been the RAC. Although not immune
to political pressure, RAC review of the ﬁrst human gene therapy protocols has been measured,
informed, and most importantly, transparent...74
•
The Food & Drug Administration (FDA)
72The RAC had already been weakened by HHS in 1981, when the IBCs, which had been established to ensure the imple-
mentation of RAC regulations, were consolidated with and subordinated to the Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), which had
been mandated in 1974 by the National Research Act. The National Research Act was passed in response to revelations of
severe abuses of participants in clinical trials, e.g., the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital scandal, where chronically ill and weak
patients were injected with live cancer cells; the Willowbrook scandal, where mentally retarded children were infected with
hepatitis; and the Tuskegee syphilis scandal, where 400 black men diagnosed with syphilis were put under observation but not
informed of their condition. The Act required the implementation of IRBs to oversee clinical trials at all institutions conducting
federally funded research.
73Fukuyama, supra note 21.
22As detailed above, the FDA inherited responsibility for gene therapy from the RAC, and in January 1998,
the FDA asserted jurisdiction over human cloning research.75 For the FDA to be capable of regulating
cloning research, cloned embryos would have to fall within the scope of the statutes which empower the
FDA. More speciﬁcally, cloned embryos would have to be considered a drug or device under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA) or a biological product under the Biologics Act.76 Although
the FDA’s assertion of authority over cloning has not been tested in court, its legality is dubious. As one
writer contends, the arguments for FDA jurisdiction appear to be “legally unsupportable”77 based on a
common sense reading of the statutes, their legislative intent, and their traditional interpretation.78
To have jurisdiction over cloning under the FDCA, the FDA must demonstrate that a cloned embryo is a
“drug” or “device” as deﬁned by the statute. According to § 201(g) of the FDCA, a “drug” is an “article[
] intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other
animals; and [an] article[ ] (other than food), intended to aﬀect the structure or any function of the body
of man or other animals.” A threshold question is whether an embryo is an “article” within the meaning
of the statute. Based on the types of items to which this provision has historically been applied, e.g.,
pharmaceuticals, it is unlikely that a cloned embryo would be considered an “article.”79
Moreover, even if an embryo were considered an “article,” the article must be “intended to treat disease or
aﬀect the structure or function of the body.” In the context of reproductive cloning, the embryo would be
“intended to treat disease” only if the parent or couple were infertile.80 If the cloning procedure were an
75Elizabeth Price, Does the FDA Have Authority to Regulate Human Cloning?, 11 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 619, 624-25 (1998).
The Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO) may have prompted the FDA to claim jurisdiction over cloning because FDA
regulation was, from the industry’s point of view, a more desirable option than the legislative ban which Congress was considering
at the time. The President of BIO sent Donna Shalala, the Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services, a letter
which suggested that the FDA could regulate cloning. Four days later, the Acting Commissioner of the FDA, Michael Friedman,
announced that the FDA would assert jurisdiction.
76§ 351 of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA).
77Price, supra note 75, at 641.
78Gregory J. Rokosz, Human Cloning: Is the Reach of FDA Authority Too Far a Stretch?, 30 Seton Hall L. Rev. 464, 501
(2000).
79See, e.g., Price, supra note 75, at 633; Rokocz, supra note 78, at 503-504. These authors point out that legislative intent
and a common sense reading of the statute are additional reasons to believe that an embryo is not an “article.”
80Rokocz, supra note 78, at 501.
23elective one – i.e., the parent desires a clone merely to create an exact genetic replica of himself or herself –
there is no disease which would justify FDA jurisdiction. In the therapeutic cloning context, an embryo could
fall within FDA authority since it is intended to produce tissues to treat disease.81 For both reproductive
and therapeutic cloning, one could argue that the implantation of a cloned embryo is “intended to aﬀect the
structure or function of the body,” but such a broad reading of the statute is hard to defend. If a cloned
embryo is deemed to aﬀect the structure and function of the body, then it would follow that other types of
embryos, e.g., embryos produced for in vitro fertilization, would fall within the FDA’s jurisdiction. Tellingly,
the FDA has never claimed authority over procedures used in infertility clinics.
According to a similar analysis, a cloned embryo is probably not a “device” under the FDCA, where a device
is deﬁned in § 201(h) as follows:
[A]n instrument, apparatus, implement... implant... or other similar or related article... which is...
intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment
or prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or intended to aﬀect the structure or any function
of the body of man or other animals, and which does not achieve its primary intended purposes
through chemical action within or on the body of man or other animals and which is not dependent
upon being metabolized for the achievement of its primary intended purposes.
Again, a threshold question is whether an embryo is an “instrument, apparatus... or other similar or related
article.” The legislative history of the statute clearly suggests that this section was intended to cover items
of a mechanical nature, so it is unlikely that an embryo would qualify as a device.82 Furthermore, even if
one could successfully argue that an embryo is an “article,” one would still have to surmount the hurdle, as
in the drug analysis above, of showing that the embryo is “intended to treat disease” or “aﬀect the structure
or function of the body.”
81Price, supra note 75, at 630-33.
82Id. at 638.
24The most plausible basis for FDA jurisdiction may be under the Biologics Act, which empowers the FDA to
regulate “biological products.” A “biological product” is deﬁned as a “virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, anti-
toxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative... or analogous product, applicable to the prevention,
treatment, or cure of diseases or injuries of man.” Since the term “analogous product” is vague, one could
conceivably argue that an embryo is one; however, the PHSA was motivated by the desire to assure the
safety of vaccines, blood transfusions, and other instruments of public health. It is unlikely that Congress
contemplated the regulation of embryos under the Act;83 moreover, one would have to demonstrate that the
cloned embryo is intended to treat disease.
The legal basis for FDA jurisdiction therefore appears to be rather tenuous. As one author concludes,
“The statutory background, legislative history, and resulting language of the [statutes] clearly demonstrate
that Congress neither contemplated the potential ramiﬁcations of human cloning procedures nor drafted the
statutory language broadly enough to encompass such a radically new technology.”84 Furthermore, Congress’
eﬀort to pass cloning legislation suggests that Congress does not intend to delegate regulatory authority over
cloning to the FDA.85
Even if the FDA were to have valid jurisdiction over cloning under its empowering statutes, it is questionable
whether the oversight regime would be desirable. Since jurisdiction hinges on whether the embryo is intended
to cure disease, the FDA would be able to regulate therapeutic cloning and reproductive cloning in cases
where a parent or couple is infertile. The FDA would have no authority, however, over reproductive cloning
for purely elective purposes because there is no disease in this situation. Ironically, then, the FDA would be
able to control the more morally palatable uses of cloning technology, but would have no regulatory power
over the much more objectionable practice of elective cloning.
Although Congress could amend the empowering statutes to ﬁll such gaps in the FDA’s authority, the FDA
83Id. at 639.
84Rokocz, supra note 78, at 498.
85Id. at 513.
25may still not be a suitable arena for considering the ethical and social implications of human cloning. The
agency already has a tremendous number of responsibilities and often lacks suﬃcient resources to carry them
out thoroughly. Also, as illustrated by the transition of gene therapy regulation from the RAC to the FDA,
the FDA tends to focus on health and safety, rather than considering more normative questions. As one au-
thor states, “Although the FDA appears to be a good candidate for the oversight of genetically manipulated
reproductive technology, it may not be the appropriate forum for deciding the moral and ethical limits of
the use of such technology.”86 It may be impossible, and even unwise, to modify a long-held institutional
culture which makes the FDA so eﬀective at its other regulatory responsibilities.
Furthermore, it would be tricky for the FDA to be eﬀective in two very diﬀerent roles simultaneously. To
make bioethics policy, the FDA would have to build consensus among diverse parties, including the same
companies and researchers whom the FDA must police and sanction in its regulatory capacity. There are
already concerns about the FDA’s objectivity,87 and saddling the FDA with the responsibility of developing
bioethics regulations could introduce additional conﬂicts of interest.
As shown above, the Executive Branch has not been a source of robust bioethics policy. Presidential
initiatives like the NBAC conducted extensive hearings and made recommendations on diﬃcult topics such
as cloning and stem cells, but its advisory nature and lack of implementation capacity prevented its work
from becoming more ﬁrmly ensconced as lasting policy. President Bush’s Council on Bioethics has similar
limitations; moreover, the Council may have trouble gaining widespread legitimacy because of the perception
86Christine Willgoos, FDA Regulation: An Answer to the Questions of Human Cloning and Germline Gene Therapy, 27
Am. J.L. & Med. 101, 124 (2001). See also Fukuyama, supra note 21:
The FDA is not set up to make politically sensitive decisions concerning the point at which selection for characteristics like
intelligence or height cease to be therapeutic and become enhancing, or whether such selection can be considered therapeutic
at all. The only grounds on which the FDA can prohibit a procedure are eﬀectiveness and safety. But there will be many safe
and eﬀective procedures in the coming biotechnology revolution that will nonetheless require regulatory scrutiny.
87Elliott, supra note 36. Elliott argues that the FDA is “deeply compromised” by industry money because the pharmaceutical
industry pays user fees to the FDA in order to expedite product review. Similarly, Richard Horton, editor of the prestigious
journal The Lancet, laments that the FDA is the “servant of the drug industry.”
26that it is ideologically biased. Eﬀorts by Executive agencies to regulate controversial biotechnologies have also
been less than successful. The RAC is the only group which consistently asks normative ethical questions;
however, its mandate is limited to gene splicing technology, and it currently has very little actual authority.
Although the FDA inherited regulatory control over gene splicing from the RAC and has recently and
dubiously asserted jurisdiction over cloning, the FDA does not appear to be well-suited to undertake the
type of bioethical inquiry which these technologies demand.
Federal government – Congress
Despite several attempts to pass human cloning legislation, Congress has been unable to do so. Following
the Dolly announcement, legislators rushed to introduce measures to regulate human cloning. Although
there was widespread agreement that something needed to be done, Congress could not agree on what to
do. Nine separate proposals were drafted and considered, but ultimately none of them was enacted. It
will always be diﬃcult to craft a cloning bill because of the polarized positions on the issue. On one hand,
right-to-life proponents and other allied groups seek a broad ban on all cloning, while on the other hand,
patient advocates and the scientiﬁc community favor a more limited ban which allows potentially beneﬁcial
research to continue. Beyond the inherent diﬃculty of reconciling such incompatible views, the challenges
of drafting legislative language contributed to the demise of these bills. Some of these bills were sloppily
written, perhaps because of the haste with which they were drafted. For example, the Ehlers bill proposed
to prohibit “the use of a human somatic cell for the process of producing a human clone” but neglected
to deﬁne “somatic cell” or “human clone.”88 Other bills were handicapped by loopholes. The Campbell,
Bond, and Lott bills were intended to prohibit all cloning practices, but their imprecise language would have
88Willgoos, supra note 86, at 116. H.R. 922 and 923, 105th Cong (1997).
27allowed certain cloning practices to continue.89
In 2001, the announcement by a biotechnology company, Advanced Cell Technologies, that it had successfully
cloned a human embryo prompted Congress to renew its eﬀorts to pass cloning legislation. In July 2001,
the House resoundingly passed (265-162) a bill which prohibits both reproductive and therapeutic cloning
and makes it a crime to sell or use any treatments which use cloning techniques.90 In turn, Republicans
in the Senate introduced a bill which would place a six-month moratorium on all cloning until the Senate
could consider the issue more carefully. To force a quicker vote on the moratorium, it was bundled with
other, unrelated measures, including a proposal to allow drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and
a provision for railroad workers’ retirement beneﬁts.91 The Senate failed to take up the moratorium because
it was tied to these other contentious measures.
Recently, the Senate revived the cloning issue and began debating a proposal similar to the House bill which
passed in July 2001. The Senate is deeply divided, with many members worried that the measure closes
the door too strongly on potentially beneﬁcial research. As Senator Feinstein (D-CA) said, “This is a very
promising ﬁeld of research... [Passing the bill would be] like throwing the baby out with the bathwater.”92
The vote is so close that the likely outcome remains unclear.93
This brief history of cloning legislation in Congress demonstrates the limitations of the legislative process for
bioethics policy. In particular, legislation tends to be crisis-driven rather than proactive. Given Congress’
huge breadth of responsibilities, it is understandable that Congress tends to react only after some major
event has brought an issue to its attention; however, this limitation of Congress is particularly troublesome
89Id. at 116. S. 1574, 105th Cong. (1998); S. 1599, 105th Cong. (1998); S. 1601, 105th Cong. (1998).
90Sheryl Gay Stolberg, House Backs Ban on Human Cloning for Any Objective, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 2001, at A1. The bill
makes cloning a crime punishable by up to ten years in prison.
91Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Declines to Take Up Proposed Cloning Moratorium, N.Y. Times.com, Dec. 4, 2001.
92Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Rallies Opponents of Cloning, N.Y. Times.com, Apr. 10, 2002.
93Id.
28for bioethical issues because they require careful thought. As one writer notes:
[T]hose engaged in public policy and ethical discourse must struggle to understand the new science
or technology, as well as the implications of these scientiﬁc developments for society. Therefore, not
only does ethical deliberation begin much too late, but it also develops more slowly...
Informed and thorough ethical discussion addresses both the present and future applications
of technology and science. In fact, a common role for ethicists and policymakers alike is to specu-
late on future applications and implications associated with scientiﬁc innovation. This speculation
requires time not often aﬀorded those charged with shaping the development of bioethics policy or
law.94
The intense pressure to respond quickly to high-visibility events means that legislative proposals may not
be drafted as thoughtfully as possible. Furthermore, in the haste to consider them, these proposals may
be coupled with other, unrelated measures which can derail bioethics proposals for reasons aside from their
intrinsic merit. Congress’ failure to pass cloning legislation is a case study in the diﬃculty of taking legislative
action, even when there is widespread consensus that some action is necessary.
State legislation
State legislatures also responded to the Dolly announcement by proposing laws to outlaw human repro-
ductive cloning. Nearly thirty states considered legislation, and several states eventually enacted measures.
California was the pioneeer with the California Cloning Act,95 which imposed a ﬁve-year ban on human
reproductive cloning. Michigan passed a similar law shortly thereafter96 and also prohibited the use of state
funds for cloning research.97 Rhode Island has also outlawed reproductive cloning,98 and Missouri proscribed
95Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 24185 et seq. (West 1997). The statute deﬁnes cloning as the “practice of creating or
attempting to create a human being by transferring the nucleus from a human cell from whatever source into a human egg cell
from which the nucleus has been removed for the purpose of [sic], or to implant, the resulting product to initiate a pregnancy
that could result in the birth of a human being.” § 24185(c). See also Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 2260.5, 16004, 16105
(West 1997), which proscribe cloning practices as unprofessional conduct and provide for revocation of licenses for violations
of cloning laws.
96Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 333.16274 et seq. (West 1998).
97Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 333.26401 et seq. (West 1998).
98R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-16.4-2 (1998).
29the use of state funds for reproductive cloning purposes.99 More recently, Louisiana enacted a ﬁve-year ban
on reproductive cloning,100 and Virginia has proscribed the practice indeﬁnitely.101
Religious positions
Religion occupies an important, yet uncomfortable, place in bioethical debate. Religion provides the vocab-
ulary and doctrinal tools to articulate and consider questions about whether scientiﬁcally feasible activities
are ethically permissible. At the same time, the heterogeneity of religious views tends to complicate, rather
than simplify, bioethical debate. As one writer observes:
We live in an increasingly pluralistic society. Within all Western countries there is no longer a single
shared set of moral values. Even the various religions disagree on ethical matters and many people
no longer accept any religious teaching... Nevertheless, there is still great value in taking seriously
the various traditions – religious and otherwise – that have given rise to ethical conclusions. People
do not live their lives in isolation; they grow up within particular moral traditions.102
A brief survey of some diﬀerent denominations’ views on stem cell research demonstrates the extent of
variation across religious traditions. On one hand, there are absolute positions such as those taken by the
Catholic and Greek Orthodox Churches. Catholics, who believe that life begins at conception, are opposed
to stem cell research and any other biotechnologies which involve manipulation of embryos. As Pope John
Paul II said in 2001, “A free and virtuous society, which America aspires to be, must reject practices that
devalue and violate human life at any stage from conception until natural death.”103 Although the Greek
Orthodox Church does not view an embryo as a life, the Church believes that an embryo’s “strong residue
of the God-given likeness” prohibits manipulation. According to a clergyman at the Holy Cross School of
Theology, “[T]he establishment of embryonic stem cell lines was done at the cost of human lives. Even though
99Mo. Ann. Stat. § 1.217 (West 1998).
100La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1299.36.2 (West 1999). Part D provides that violations shall be punishable by ﬁnes of up to $10
million and/or imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for up to ten years.
101Va. Code Ann. § 32.1-162.22 (2001).
103The Stem Cell Debate: The Embryonic Journey and Its Milestones, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 2001, at F4.
30not yet a human person, an embryo should not be used for or sacriﬁced in experimentation, no matter how
noble the goal may seem.”104
In contrast, other religious traditions take a less absolute position. Islam views an embryo as a “drop of
matter” until ensoulment occurs at 120 days; therefore, most Sunni and Shiite Muslims endorse carefully
regulated embryonic stem cell research for therapeutic purposes, as long as it is conducted before ensoulment
occurs.105 Judaism views an embryo as a potential life worthy of some degree of special consideration;
however, an embryo has no legal status under Jewish law and is not considered part of a human being until
implanted in the womb.106 Thus Judaism does not proscribe the in vitro cultivation of embryos for stem
cells.107 Despite the diﬃculty of reconciling diﬀerent religious traditions, religion – or at least moral concepts
which can be generalized from religious thought without relying on any particular religious authority – has a
role in bioethical debate. Many religious ideas are consonant with background ethical beliefs that are shared,
to at least some degree, by most people in society.
It has also been challenging to incorporate religious discourse into bioethics debates because of the strong
secular bias in public policy conversations. As one writer describes:
104Id.
105Id.
106Id.
107Tully, supra note 20, at 1403. The Jewish faith also condones cloning for certain therapeutic purposes and for repro-
ductive purposes under extraordinary circumstances, e.g., a sterile, last-in-line descendant of a family killed during the Holo-
caust. Generally, however, most religious leaders are opposed to cloning. See, e.g., June 1997 NBAC Report, available in
<http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/nbac/pubs.html> (visited Apr. 8, 2002).
31In bioethics discourse in North America, particularly when public policy or law is addressed, it is
typically assumed that acceptable arguments must meet a standard of rationality, secularity, and
empirical demonstrability that excludes religion. On this assumption, participants in the debate
must shed particularistic identities and commitments and enter into a realm of neutrality in which
only what is rationally self-evident to all, empirically demonstrated, or clearly derived from, and
coherent with existing laws and practices, will govern the public regulation of research and clinical
medicine.108
Thus the challenge is to couch religious themes in terms that can be integrated into public policy discussion.
Just as scientists must try to make biotechnology accessible to non-scientists, the religious community must
aspire to universalize its contributions to bioethical debate. In a recent book on religious ethics in genetic
science, the author urges religious leaders to be more concrete and practical in their policy views. Instead
of making categorical, general statements such as “humans and animals are creations of God [and therefore]
should not be patented as human inventions,”109 she suggests that they take a more nuanced view which
acknowledges that the market and scientiﬁc freedom have some role in improving human welfare. She further
suggests that religious leaders try to formulate policy alternatives which incorporate theological concerns.110
The scientiﬁc community
Although some accuse the scientiﬁc community of being essentially amoral,111 scientists have voiced many
concerns about the consequences of biotechnological progress. For example, the academic and industrial
research communities have observed a voluntary moratorium on germline gene therapy for over a decade.112
With respect to cloning, Professor Wilmut, who led the team which cloned Dolly, admitted that he is uneasy
about where cloning could ultimately go and believes that it is morally irresponsible that the United States
109Quoting the 1995 Joint Appeal Against Human and Animal Patenting.
110Lisa Sowle Cahill, Untitled, Theology Today, Vol. 58, Issue 4, Jan. 1, 2002, available in 2002 WL 13417544 (reviewing
Audrey Chapman, Unprecedented Choices: Religious Ethics at the Frontiers of Genetic Science (1999)). Chapman
also criticizes religious leaders for making policy recommendations which are reactive, rather than looking forward to technologies
which are on the horizon.
111Robinson, supra note 30, at 10-11: “Not only do scientists have precious little to say about how we should live, but scientists
themselves have distressingly poor track records with respect to recognizing any moral constraints on their activities.”
112See BIO website <www.bio.org/er/ethics.asp> (visited Apr. 8, 2002). Germline gene therapy is the manipulation of the
DNA sequence of an embryo to remove an undesirable gene or insert a desirable gene. By successfully changing the gene
sequence in the embryo, scientists can ensure that all of the adult cells will have the altered sequence.
32has not yet instituted a ban on human cloning. The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) recently completed
a study on human cloning, which signaled that the scientiﬁc community recognized the need for bioethical
consideration. In its report issued in early 2002,113 NAS concluded that Congress should outlaw human
reproductive cloning for at least ﬁve years because current techniques are dangerous and likely to fail.114
The Academy did not consider whether reproductive cloning should be allowed if it were to become medically
safe, acknowledging that in this instance a broad national dialogue on the social and ethical implications of
cloning would be needed. Although the authors of the NAS report recognized that the report’s conclusions
were couched in the language of safety and capability rather than morality and ethics, the report represents
a genuine eﬀort by the scientiﬁc community to contribute to the development of bioethical standards.
At the same time, scientists themselves have doubts about whether bioethical concerns can rein in scientiﬁc
progress. Professor Lu, the scientist who leads cloning eﬀorts in China, is personally opposed to human
reproductive cloning, but she suspects that the technology will eventually go there. “It is an irresistible
trend,” she says.115 The forefathers of the nuclear bomb noted the same tendency. Robert Oppenheimer
once said, “[There is a] cult of progress which ensures that science will proceed with little conscience and few
restraints... When you see something that is technically sweet you go ahead and do it.”116 His colleague,
John von Neumann, echoed, “Technological possibilities are irresistible to man.”117
113Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy, National Research Council, Scientiﬁc and Medical Aspects of Human
Reproductive Cloning (2002), available in <http://books.nap.edu/books/ 0309076374/html/index.html> (visited Apr. 8, 2002).
114NAS identiﬁed several dangers with current cloning technology. Experiments in ﬁve mammalian species (sheep, cattle, pigs,
goats, and mice) have had very low success rates. Many clones die in utero or shortly after birth, and the surviving clones
often have signiﬁcant birth defects. Female animals carrying cloned fetuses also face risks, including death from cloning-related
complications. Human cloning eﬀorts are likely to entail similar, if not greater, risks.
The Academy did not see the same degree of danger for therapeutic cloning and therefore concluded that therapeutic cloning
research could continue, although the NAS panel encouraged further discussion of the normative issues around this research.
115Leggett and Regalado, supra note 16.
116Id.
117Cahill, supra note 108, at 495.
33As this section shows, there have been many disparate eﬀorts to articulate bioethical principles, regulations,
and laws, but few deﬁnitive norms have crystallized. Bioethics today is in a cacophonous state. Diﬀerent
parties talk at, rather than to, each other, and eﬀorts to coordinate these parties in an interdisciplinary way
have not yielded tangible results thus far. To change this status quo, bioethical discussion must be conducted
in a more fruitful way.
34Section II: Why Bioethical Standards Are Particularly Important for Modern Biotechnology
The ﬁeld of bioethics is not new. It has existed for quite some time to address the dilemmas raised by
advances in medical science, from the distribution of transplantable organs to the enactment of living wills.
In some respects, these previous dilemmas resemble the issues raised by modern biotechnology. For instance,
the advent of life support technology asked society to determine the proper balance between an individual’s
autonomy to determine his or her own fate and medical technology’s capability to sustain his or her life
indeﬁnitely. Similarly, genetic screening technology challenges society to decide whether an unborn child
with a genetic predisposition to early-onset cancer has an autonomous right to be born, despite biomedicine’s
ability to detect and screen out this risky trait. Both situations raise uncomfortable concerns that scientists
and doctors can “play God” with interventions which enable them to sustain or end life.
Despite some similarities in general principles and rhetoric, however, the types of bioethical concerns raised
by modern biotechnologies are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in degree and kind from those which society has grappled
with thus far. Biotechnologies demand more caution because they are likely to aﬀect many more people than
previous medical advances. For example, a limited number of patients end up on life support or require an
organ transplant, whereas a stem cell-based cancer therapy would be relevant to many more people. Also,
because genetic techniques involve manipulation of the code which is the fundamental basis of humanity and
individuality, the ethical considerations are of a completely diﬀerent nature than those for more traditional
interventions. There is a clear distinction, for example, between a risky surgical procedure to correct a rare,
neonatal heart condition and a “therapy” which involves the screening out of embryos with genes linked to
the condition. The following section aims to more fully articulate these and other rationales for developing
35clearer and more uniform bioethical principles.
Moral and philosophical qualms
A fundamental moral concern about genetic technologies is that the human genome is sacrosanct and thus
should not be manipulated. This belief has been expressed in many ways, from a religion-based view that
an embryo which embodies a unique genetic combination is life itself, to a more pantheistic notion that
there is sanctity in man’s relationship with nature which imparts an obligation not to interfere with the
“natural” gene pool. In addition to these philosophical qualms, there are practical reasons to worry about
meddling with the gene pool. One may be skeptical of whether scientists can outwit Darwinism, and one can
reasonably worry that scientists might unwittingly induce genetic modiﬁcations that will ultimately reduce,
rather than enhance, humans’ capacity to adapt and survive. Cloning, for example, enables reproduction
without the recombination of genes, and it is possible that widespread cloning could lead to detrimental
mutations or concentration of undesirable traits.118
Even if scientists could manipulate the genome with perfect safety, however, there are several other reasons
that society may feel uncomfortable with these practices. First, the ability to change the genome may
alter society’s tolerance for individual variations. As philosopher of science Philip Kitcher notes, “Once we
have left the garden of genetic innocence, some form of eugenics is inescapable.”119 Scientists have already
identiﬁed the genes for several traits, and they will undoubtedly pinpoint more. They will also learn to
modify them. William Saﬁre’s question is therefore an appropriate one to ask: “How far should we go in
118Another example is the gene for sickle-cell anemia, which also promotes resistance to malaria. Consider, for example, a
genetic intervention which successfully eliminates sickle-cell anemia but detrimentally lowers the capacity to ward oﬀ malaria.
119Brave, supra note 19.
36extending our lives, in freeing bounded minds, in deﬁantly removing all crimson birthmarks to perfect our
bodies?”120
At the same time, it is important to avoid excessively deterministic assumptions about the extent to which
genetics can dictate the way people look or behave. Although some traits are a function of a ﬁnite number
of genes, most of the traits which account for a person’s unique personality and physical characteristics are
polygenic – i.e., governed by many genes. So many genes may be involved that science may never be able
to fully identify or understand the interactions among all of them. Moreover, the expression of these genes
is aﬀected by the array of environmental inﬂuences that a person encounters over his or her lifetime. As a
result, science’s ability to produce a “made-to-order” person is inherently limited. As one writer states,
I reject the genetic determinism implicit in the... human dignity argument. The clone and the
cloner will not be identical... They will grow up in diﬀerent environments and encounter divergent
life experiences and peers. Random events, such a luck and chance, as well as life choices and
free will, will play a role in the development of the clone’s personality, character, behavior, and
intellectual capabilities.121
Even so, history bears witness to the fact that man has tried to engage in eugenics many times in the past,
and genetic tools are the most powerful yet for the eugenically minded.
Some also worry that biotechnology could lead to the objectiﬁcation of human life. This fear may be most
acute in a therapeutic cloning scenario where a child is cloned as a source of tissue for the parent – i.e., a
“spare organ bank.” In the reproductive cloning context, some argue that the parent of a cloned child may
unreasonably expect the child to strongly resemble himself or herself, rather than allowing and encouraging
the cloned child to develop his or her own identity.122
120William Saﬁre, The Crimson Birthmark, N.Y. Times.com, Jan. 21, 2002. Saﬁre’s question refers to the Nathaniel
Hawthorne short story, “The Birthmark,” in which a scientist who is obsessed by a small birthmark on his wife’s cheek,
“a crimson stain upon the snow,” administers a remedy to correct it which ends up killing her.
122Cahill, supra note 108, at 492-93.
37Cloning may also challenge society’s conception of the traditional family structure. Cloning would make it
possible for a woman to have a child without a genetic contribution from a man, and a man could have a
child without a genetic contribution from a woman as long as he has access to a surrogate womb. Fukuyama
foresees that cloning “will establish... unnatural relationships between parents and children. A cloned child
will have a very asymmetrical relationship with his or her parents. He or she will be both child and twin of
the parent from whom his or her genes come, but will not be related to the other parent in any way.”123
While these potential threats to society’s notions of individuality and the family should not be taken lightly,
they must be evaluated in a measured way. For example, the outcry over cloning children as “spare organ
banks” may be more hypothetical than realistic. Therapeutic cloning does not involve the gestation and
birth of children from whom tissues could be harvested. Rather, therapeutic cloning refers to the practice
of cloning embryos in order to extract stem cells,124 which are then grown into tissues in a laboratory. With
respect to reproductive cloning, it not clear how much demand there would actually be for cloned oﬀspring.
Even if there were fairly widespread demand,125 the fears that clones will be treated diﬀerently by society
and by parents may be overstated. As society becomes more informed about and familiar with cloning, it
may develop less objectionable expectations about cloned children. After all, identical twins share the same
genetic sequence, but society and their parents do not expect the twins to be the same, nor do they view
each twin as a less unique individual person because there is a genetic copy of that person. Similarly, a child
who is an exact genetic copy of a parent cannot, and should not, be expected to become an identical person.
123Fukuyama, supra note 21.
124Stem cells are harvested when embryos consist of approximately 300 cells.
125There does not appear to be tremendous desire for cloned children at this time, but the literature identiﬁes potential sources
of demand as infertile parents who would prefer to clone rather than adopt, homosexual couples, the last member of a family
who wishes to perpetuate his or her lineage (e.g., Holocaust survivor).
38The implications of cloning for the family structure may also not be so diﬀerent
from changes which society has already tolerated. As one writer notes:
For me, human cloning represents another in the existing array of assisted reproductive techniques...
I am willing to slide down the slippery slope of assisted reproduction practices deviating from the
traditional concept of reproduction, which include medical treatment of infertility, artiﬁcial insemi-
nation, in vitro fertilization, and surrogate motherhood. Cloning merely represents an incremental
step beyond these technological advances which have changed our notion of reproduction...
[T]he genie is already out of the bottle today with respect to the non-nuclear family. The
past several decades have witnessed a remarkable transformation of the “family”... Although we
should encourage the formation of traditional families and help them remain intact, we should
respect the value of personal choice [to opt for a non-traditional family].126
Another concern about some biotechnologies is that they could exacerbate inequalities in society. This
position envisions that the socio-economically fortunate will have access to techniques which reﬁne their
genomes and thereby solidify their social and intellectual advantages, whereas the less fortunate will be
unable to aﬀord these technologies and thus fall even further behind. As one author observes:
It is a matter of human and cultural fact that people want to have babies and want to give them all
the advantages in life they can aﬀord. In the absence of restrictions on other ways the wealthy can
equip their children for a privileged life, it is diﬃcult to envision limits on the marketing of beneﬁts
like genetic enhancement, projected to be available soon via ‘reprogenetics.’... Not only would the
poor and uninsured be excluded from these choices, they may well continue to lack basic health care
and other important necessities like decent public education.127
While equity concerns deserve serious consideration, it is not clear whether they should halt scientiﬁc
progress. After all, genetics may provide cheaper ways to treat certain conditions and thereby make beneﬁts
more, rather than less, widely available. According to the libertarian view espoused by one writer:
39We should not allow our fears of the distributional consequences of genetic enhancement to limit
technological advancements, including human cloning. First, the specter of social inequities is con-
gruent with other choices modern capitalistic society allows parents. Today, aﬄuent parents can
oﬀer their children all sorts of environmental enhancement, from summer camps to the latest com-
puter technology, from music lessons to a ﬁrst rate college education. Second, the cost of genetic
enhancement may drop substantially in the future and come within the reach of average or even
poor couples or individuals.128
Clearly, there are deep moral and philosophical schisms on the propriety of various biotechnologies. These
diﬀerences of opinion emanate from ﬁrmly held beliefs which are not readily amenable to rational discussion
and resolution. On one hand, opponents of cloning, stem cells, and other controversial biotechnologies – a
coalition of diverse groups encompassing pro-life activists to environmentalists – view these technologies as
fundamentally, unconditionally wrong. On the other hand, patient advocates, scientists, and the biotechnol-
ogy industry are just as passionately convinced that these technologies are a force for good. Indeed, some
argue that it would be morally derelict for scientists to refrain from seeking as much knowledge as possible
to heal the sick and improve the human condition.
Unresolved, these diﬀerences of opinion will perpetuate an unease about biotechnology which society can
ill aﬀord. The unending controversy over abortion is an instructive parallel. Although the Supreme Court
decided that abortion is legal under certain circumstances, Americans remain bitterly divided. Abortion foes
continue to try to restrict the practice, with extreme activists even resorting to violence to underscore their
beliefs. Abortion supporters work vigilantly to maintain the legality of the practice and uneasily recognize
that a slight shift in the composition of the Supreme Court could lead to a ban on the procedure. Since
biotechnology is likely to be relevant to far more people than abortion is, and since biotechnology implicates a
much broader range of ethical and philosophical concerns, the consequences of allowing bioethical diﬀerences
to fester could be very problematic.
To some extent, science may discover alternatives which enable society to enjoy the beneﬁts of biomedical
progress without getting mired in ethical dilemmas. For example, ﬁnding a way to use stem cells from bone
40marrow, umbilical cord, or adult cells instead of embryonic stem cells would obviate questions about whether
it is proper to manipulate embryos.129 Scientiﬁc solutions are likely to go only so far, however, and society
will not be able to escape the need to make some diﬃcult bioethical decisions. The lines of bioethics policy
will not be easy to draw, but with concerted eﬀort it should be possible. As one writer urges,
[T]o say the line’s exact location is unclear does not mean it does not exist or cannot be drawn.
Can anyone really believe there is no way to distinguish, morally or legally, between preventing a
vicious disease such as Alzheimer’s and seeking to make a better piano player? Saying so is the
wrong approach to a technology that oﬀers such hope.130
Deterrence and norm articulation
In addition to the substantive reasons outlined above, there are what might be described as “symbolic”
reasons to systematically develop bioethics policies. The eﬀort to articulate policies would, in and of itself,
serve as a statement that society views biotechnologies as materially diﬀerent from previous medical advances.
As Fukuyama notes, “It is important to lay down at an early point a political marker that will demonstrate
that the development of these technologies is not inevitable, and that societies can exercise some measure
of control over the pace and scope of technological advance.”131 Fukuyama’s political marker is particularly
important in light of the powerful forces that are driving biomedical progress forward.
•
The scientiﬁc imperative
The competitive nature of biomedical research fuels scientiﬁc progress. In order to distinguish themselves
129On Human Embryos and Medical Research: An Appeal for Ethically Responsible Science and Public Policy, 16 Issues L.
and Med. 261, 266-67 (2001). These alternative sources of stem cells are already being used in certain cancer treatments
and are being investigated for leukemia and other diseases. See also Vernon J. Ehlers, The Case Against Human Cloning,
27 Hofstra L. Rev. 523, 530 (1999): “Because of the ethical and moral concerns raised by the use of embryos for research
purposes it would be far more desirable to explore the direct use of human cells of adult origin to produce specialized cells or
tissues for transplantation into patients.”
131Fukuyama, supra note 21.
41and to attract research funding, scientists continue to push the bounds of what is technologically possible.
Countries can also get caught up in the pursuit of scientiﬁc supremacy. As observed by Nobel Laureate Paul
Berg:
To many Western scientists, China’s leap into embryo cloning [for therapeutic stem cell harvesting]
lends credence to their argument that the technology is all but unstoppable, despite any ethical
objections it might raise. Some even predict that fears of falling behind in a biotech race with China
could spur the U.S. to set aside some of its misgivings... We will either condemn [the Chinese] as
godless members of an evil empire, or we will say, “Hey, wait a second, we can’t be left out of this
race.”132
Furthermore, scientiﬁc progress is unpredictable. Science often advances through serendipitous, unexpected
discoveries, and since today’s bioscience is global, well-funded, and equipped with the latest technological
capabilities, breakthroughs are literally possible at any time.
Thus science has a “Pandora’s Box” tendency. It has an innate momentum which can lead to the rapid
advancement of technology without thorough consideration of the moral or societal consequences, and once
capabilities become available, it is diﬃcult – perhaps impossible – to fully contain them. An illustrative
example is the continuing proliferation of nuclear weapons, despite strenuous eﬀorts to eliminate them.
Therefore, as one writer urges, “[O]pen dialogue among members of scientiﬁc, philosophical, ethical, and
general communities at large is crucial before the ‘biomedical genies’ are released from their bottles – not
afterwards.”133
The need for pre-emptive bioethical norms is particularly acute because of the very ﬁne – perhaps non-
existent – line between biotechnology for good and biotechnology for misuse. Scientiﬁc progress is usually
motivated by the best of intentions – i.e., to develop therapies for debilitating illnesses. As one writer
explains, however, “[t]he reality is that once we discover the means to manipulate DNA for therapeutic
purposes in our drive to cure disease, we will have discovered the means for manipulating DNA for any
133Smith, supra note 31, at 102.
42other purpose, such as genetic enhancement or even, as some have suggested, incorporating genes from other
species into the human genome.”134 Moreover, there will always be renegade scientists who deliberately
engage in morally dubious work. For example, Chicago biophysicist Dr. Seed alarmed people everywhere
when he announced in 1998 that he intended to clone himself as the ﬁrst cloned human being. Similarly,
European doctors Panos Zavos and Severino Antinori prompted renewed worries when they declared in 2001
that they planned to set up an international consortium to clone humans within two years.135 Obviously,
the availability of bioethical norms would be particularly useful for condemning the activities of scientists
like Dr. Seed.
•
The market imperative
The profound power of market forces is another reason to establish ex ante bioethical norms. As more and
more money is invested in scientiﬁc research, research becomes an end in itself and ethical debate tends
to be muted. As one writer describes, the market can confer ethical acceptability by default: “Financial
imperatives will conspire with technological imperatives to confer upon cloning a societal legitimacy that,
as a moral matter, it will never have earned.”136 One example is the system of gene patenting. Because
biotechnology companies, which desire patents to secure the value of their research investments, successfully
pushed to establish the practice of gene patenting, there is no longer a window of opportunity to discuss the
propriety of owning pieces of the genome.
134Brave, supra note 19.
135Rumors from an article in The Gulf News, an English language newspaper in the United Arab Emirates, have suggested
that Dr. Antinori has helped a woman become eight weeks pregnant with a cloned embryo; however, these rumors have not
been conﬁrmed. Stolberg, supra, at note 68.
136Robinson, supra note 30, at 13.
43The inﬂuence of the market is a particularly relevant consideration for biotechnology because a signiﬁcant
amount of innovation is expected to occur within for-proﬁt, private companies. In the past, when the federal
government was the predominant source of funding for cutting-edge research, scientiﬁc developments could be
monitored and, if necessary, regulated by attaching restrictions to those funds.137 When research is conducted
within private companies, there is no easy way to observe or control it.138 Private, for-proﬁt companies are
unlikely to be forthcoming about their activities, since disclosure could vitiate their competitive position in
the marketplace; moreover, private companies have tremendous incentives to disregard fuzzy ethical questions
if doing so will beneﬁt their bottom line. As the director of the bioethics program at the University of Miami
warns, “Mind you, what’s wrong with the in vitro fertilization industry is precisely what’s going to go wrong
with the stem cell industry, namely, it’s heavily privatized and it’s not regulated.”139
Finally, it is important to remember that these proﬁt-seeking companies can exist only because they are
responding to tremendous demands in the marketplace. Biotechnology is attractive to people who are
desperate for hope and help. Patients aﬄicted with debilitating diseases like Parkinson’s disease and terminal
cancer are hungry for cures. Similarly, there seem to be few limits to the amount of eﬀort and expense which
infertile couples are willing to incur in order to have a child, as evidenced by the growth of the lucrative
artiﬁcial reproductive technologies (ART) industry. People may even have a voracious appetite for medical
interventions which are not essential to health, as the burgeoning ﬁeld of cosmetic surgery suggests. As long
137Even those entities which traditionally relied on federal funds, e.g., universities, are not insulated from the market impera-
tive. Since the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act, which allowed universities to patent their discoveries and license them out for commercial-
ization, many universities have become more closely intertwined with the biotech industry. In 1999, universities ﬁled for 7,612
patents, executed 3,295 licenses, and received adjusted gross licensing income of $641 million. See Brave, supra note 19, at 7.
See also Fukuyama, supra note 21, who points out that the nature of the scientiﬁc community has changed. While at one time
the scientiﬁc pioneers were “pure” scientists in universities, there are few academic researchers today without some links to the
biotechnology industry or even explicit commercial interests in certain technologies.
138Stolberg, supra note 35. An example of private companies’ secrecy is the experience of Glenn McGee, a philosopher and
assistant professor of bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania. McGee resigned from the ethics board of Advanced Cell
Technologies because he felt that the privately held company was too secretive. Shortly thereafter, a newspaper reporter asked
Professor McGee to comment on an animal cloning experiment which was being conducted by a company which the reporter
could not reveal. The company turned out to be Advanced Cell Technologies. Even as a recent member of the ethics board,
McGee had been unaware of this experiment.
139Face to Face: [Interview with] Ken Goodman, Bioethicist, Discusses Stem Cell Research, Cloning, HMOs and More, S.
Fla. Sun-Sentinel, Sept. 23, 2001, available in 2001 WL 22757369.
44as there is robust demand for medical – and perhaps even non-medical – uses of biotechnology, companies
will strive to meet that demand.
•
Economic considerations
Ex ante bioethical standards could also lead to the more economically eﬃcient use of research and devel-
opment resources. Today, ethical discussions, regulation, and law typically emerge only after a scientiﬁc
advance has occurred – i.e., only after millions of dollars and many years of eﬀort have been invested in
coaxing a scientiﬁc genie out of its bottle. If biotechnology companies had some advance notice about which
technologies and applications are likely to be regulated, they could order their research priorities and devel-
opment activities accordingly. When there is uncertainty about the regulatory environment, companies may
act more hastily than would be ideal. For example, the CEO of Advanced Cell Technologies indicated that
the company felt compelled to report its cloning ﬁndings sooner because it anticipated that Congress might
move to restrict this research:
There’s one big variable here, and that’s the U.S. Congress... Given that we have regulations
in the United States that prevent [cloning], we felt that we should go forward and publish this
scientiﬁc result so scientists can have this data. Time is of the essence for people who are dying
of life-threatening disease. We want to apply these technologies as fast as we can – of course, with
appropriate debate, appropriate oversight.140
Ironically, by rushing to make its announcement, Advanced Cell Technologies may have made it more diﬃ-
cult to have appropriate debate and oversight.
Another economic factor which may deserve a place in bioethical debate is whether there should be restric-
tions on technologies which could unduly strain the health care ﬁnancing system. As many health economists
and policy-makers have concluded, one major reason for the escalating cost of health care in the United States
45is the proliferation of sophisticated technology.141 While some biotechnological innovations will be extremely
cost-eﬀective, some biotechnological interventions could be the next generation of “runaway technologies”
which raise the costs of health care for all. The high cost of health care already makes basic medical coverage
unaﬀordable for a substantial fraction of the population, so the possibility that biotechnology may further
widen the gap in health care access warrants some thought, especially if some of these “runaway technolo-
gies” are also ethically dubious ones. Bioethical standards could be useful for preventing costly and ethically
questionable technologies from multiplying.
•
Opportunity (and Obligation?) for the United States to Exercise Leadership
To some extent, there is a prisoner’s dilemma in the regulation of biotechnology; therefore, without bioethical
standards, scientiﬁc and market imperatives could conspire to create a “race to the bottom.” For example,
many countries feel that it is proper to ban human reproductive cloning, but they also recognize the ﬁnancial
beneﬁts of allowing it, e.g., investment dollars and tax revenue which come from hosting biotechnology
companies. Unless most countries agree to regulate or ban cloning, any single country’s attempt to halt
its development will be ineﬀective, since research can move relatively easily to a more hospitable regulatory
environment. As Fukuyama notes, “In the absence of [ ] international agreements, any nation that chooses
to place limits on internal development will simply give other nations a leg up.”142
As a country with tremendous political and ﬁnancial clout, and as the most biotechnologically advanced
141The proliferation of technology tends to drive up health care costs, largely through excessive utilization. The CAT scan is
an oft-cited example of an innovation which is overused, rather than employed only when truly necessary. See, e.g., Chapter
Two of Henry Aaron, Serious & Unstable Condition (1991).
142Fukuyama, supra note 21. See also Greene, supra note 29, at 359-60. A similar prisoner’s dilemma was the impetus for
the adoption of multinational fair labor standards.
46nation in the world, the United States is in a position to halt – or at least slow – this race to the bottom.
Although it could be diﬃcult to coordinate international action on bioethical issues, the United States can
exercise leadership simply by adopting standards domestically. As Fukuyama points out:
Regulation never starts at an international level. Nations have to develop rules for their own societies
before they can even begin to think about creating an international regulatory system. This is
particularly true in the case of a politically, economically, and culturally dominant country like the
United States. Other countries around the world will pay a great deal of attention to what the
United States does in its domestic law. If an international consensus on the regulation of certain
biotechnologies is ever to take shape, it is unlikely to come about in the absence of American action
at the domestic level.143
Given the United States’ ability to be so inﬂuential in setting global bioethical norms, the United States may
even have some degree of responsibility to act. According to one writer, “The failure of the United States
[to ban human cloning] does not only aﬀect this nation. Rather, it represents a missed opportunity.”144
For all of the reasons discussed above, the development of ethical norms is particularly important for modern
biotechnology.145 The period when ad hoc advisory and study commissions were suﬃcient has ended; more
concrete and systematic action is now necessary. Although science is advancing rapidly, most scientists
estimate that the ﬁrst wave of “genomic knowledge and power” is at least a decade away.146 This period of
time provides a fortunate window of opportunity for thoughtful bioethical discussion and the implementation
of appropriate regulatory structures.
This endeavor must not be entered into lightly. It will be exceedingly diﬃcult, if not impossible, to fully agree
on the principles for regulation; moreover, new forms of regulation can be costly, not only ﬁnancially but also
in the sense that missteps could dissipate conﬁdence that any meaningful and workable regulation is possible.
144Greene, supra note 29, at 361.
145It is important to note that there may be some bioethical issues which can appropriately be left to more individualized deter-
minations. These issues must be consciously and systematically identiﬁed, however, and not left to individualized determination
simply because there is no policy-making structure in place.
146Although most of the genome has been sequenced, it will take years to ﬁgure out the function of newly discovered genes
and to devise ways of manipulating them.
47Nevertheless, it is time for society to squarely face these issues. As Fukuyama comments, “Regulation brings
with it many ineﬃciencies and even pathologies. But in the end, there are certain types of social problems
that can only be addressed through formal government control, and biotechnology is one of them.”147
147Fukuyama, supra note 21.
48Section III: Consideration of Diﬀerent Decision Making Options
If bioethical norms are essential, then the next question is how to develop these norms. Although it would
be convenient to employ existing regulatory structures, they have been inadequate to date, as discussed
in Section I. Arguably, advances in biotechnology have outgrown the current regulatory regime, leaving
what Fukuyama calls “gaping holes” that legislatures and administrative agencies around the world have
been racing to ﬁll.148 There is no institution in the United States which has comprehensive jurisdiction
over biotechnology, and this fragmentation in the regulatory regime is not ideal. Many bioethical issues
are relevant to more than one technology, and because many technologies are used in tandem, dispersed
regulatory eﬀorts will hamper the development of a consistent set of bioethical principles. For example,
cloning and germline gene therapy have been addressed by diﬀerent agencies,149 even though scientists are
likely to use cloning and gene therapy together.150
One potential response to this situation is to modify and strengthen existing institutions. This approach
takes advantage of structures and mechanisms which are already in place, e.g., the FDA’s well-established
process which requires researchers to submit research proposals and gain approval before clinical trials can
begin. It is an appealing idea to merely add on a bioethics component to these established structures and
mechanisms, and one writer proposes such an institution – i.e., an FDA-RAC where both agencies have been
legislatively strengthened to have real and coordinated authority over all biotechnologies.151
148Id.
149As discussed above, current cloning policy was determined by President Bush and has been implemented through restrictions
on federal funding by the NIH. On the other hand, gene therapy research is regulated by the FDA and, to some limited degree,
the RAC. There are no explicitly articulated principles which connect or integrate these regulations, and the regulatory processes
for cloning and gene therapy do not interact with each other. See, e.g., Knowles, supra note 94, at 19.
150Cloning can increase the eﬃciency of gene therapy by allowing scientists to produce several copies of a genetically treated
embryo and thereby increase the number of times that scientists can try to implant the embryo in the uterus.
151Willgoos, supra note 86, at 124.
49Arguably, a better approach is to craft an entirely new process and institution. As discussed above, the
establishment of a novel entity would send a strong message that these bioethics policies are distinct from
other types of regulations. A separate institution would also allow resources and attention to be fully focused
on bioethical issues. Given the complexity of these issues and the speed at which scientiﬁc advances occur,
there is no doubt that a dedicated institution would be more eﬀective than an institution which already
has many other responsibilities. Finally, a new entity enables a “fresh start,” free of legacy organizational
cultures and histories which may hamper novel thinking. Changed circumstances sometimes call for entirely
new measures. For example, Congress established the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to oversee air
transportation, even though the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was already in place to regulate
other, ground-based forms of transportation. Because the considerations for airplanes were so diﬀerent
from those for cars and trains, a new agency was deemed necessary. Similarly, the ethical challenges of
biotechnology warrant a new institution. Of course, any new institution can and should incorporate the
useful features of existing ones, but its structure and capabilities should be determined by what will be
most appropriate for its particular mission. The following section therefore considers the advantages and
disadvantages of diﬀerent types of institutions.
An initial consideration is whether bioethics policy should be set at the national or state level. Some argue
that states should regulate biotechnology because they traditionally regulate medical practice. It may indeed
be appropriate to leave some subset of bioethical issues to state-by-state determination, since this approach
allows local community values to be reﬂected more precisely in bioethics policies. There are several reasons
that nationally uniform policies are desirable for most bioethical issues, however.152 From a practical point
152U.S. Congress, Oﬃce of Technology Assessment, Biomedical Ethics in U.S. Public Policy – Background Paper (U.S. GPO,
Washington, D.C.), June 1993, at 27. Congress asked the Oﬃce of Technology Assessment (OTA) to analyze previous bioethics
commissions’ strengths and weaknesses in order to inform any eﬀorts to establish bioethics bodies in the future. In its report
to Congress, the OTA noted “a strong sentiment” on the need for federal, rather than local, action.
50of view, it may be diﬃcult for states to access the extensive information and expertise needed to set bioethics
policy. Also, because biotechnology is quite portable, any norm could be relatively useless if it is not at a
federal level. Without consistency across states, a “race to the bottom” within the United States would
always be possible. As one author expressed, “If forty states ban cloning, the research will take place
in the other ten.”153 Finally, uniform national standards may actually be preferable for researchers and
biotechnology companies. They will not have to comply with 50 diﬀerent sets of regulations, and a single set
of guidelines sends a clearer signal about what is and is not acceptable. Moreover, researchers and developers
can plan their activities with less uncertainty about whether the policy in a particular state will change at
some point in the future. For all of these reasons, national standards are likely to be more eﬃcient and
eﬀective.
Of the many possible sources of federal policy, Presidential initiatives and the judicial system are probably
least suitable. In some respects, the President’s involvement in the development of bioethics policy can be
beneﬁcial. The President has a unique ability to raise the proﬁle of an issue and can add momentum to the
policy-making process;154 however, the President’s proximity is also a fatal hazard. Even if a Presidential
initiative is designed in a way which is intended to minimize political partisanship, there will always be
questions about its independence. Consider, for example, the criticism that has been leveled at President
Bush’s Council on Bioethics: “Whether it’s the White House’s widely publicized concern for the Catholic
vote in key electoral states in making its stem-cell decision... what’s depressingly clear is that the political,
market and media forces so familiar to us are now shaping the future of the human genome.”155
The judicial system is also not a suitable institution because it is inherently reactive. Courts can consider
153Robinson, supra note 30, at 13.
154Joseph Palca, A New National Bioethics Commission – Maybe, The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 26, No. 1, Jan. 11,
1996, available in 1996 WL 10189220. Assessing the potential eﬀectiveness of the NBAC, Palca says, “There are a few more
encouraging signs for NBAC. First, it will exist inside the White House, rather than being assigned to an executive department.
Any agency that doesn’t play ball with NBAC risks annoying the president and his top advisers.”
155Brave, supra note 19.
51issues only when they are raised by litigants, and courts can decide issues only within the context of the
speciﬁc factual situations which are presented to them. Also, procedural rules and overburdened court
dockets can drag out litigation for months and even years, and this pace is too slow for quickly-changing
science. Finally, the common law nature of the American judicial system means that policy consensus
emerges only gradually, as disparate decisions from diﬀerent jurisdictions are reconciled by higher courts.
Moreover, there is no guarantee of ﬁnality even after the Supreme Court has decided an issue, as illustrated
by the continuing controversy over Roe v. Wade.156
More sensible places for the development of bioethics policy are in Congress or in a new regulatory agency.
The primary advantages of leaving policy-making responsibility to Congress are its plenary authority and its
ability to act quickly, if and when it wants to do so. A regulatory agency’s authority is limited to those areas
which have been granted to it, and it must open up proposed regulations for a notice and comment period
before it can enact them.157 In contrast, Congress can implement policy as soon as it can draft legislation
and muster suﬃcient votes to pass it. Of course, it is a widely known and lamented fact that Congress moves
anything but quickly on most matters, and there is little reason to think that Congress will act diﬀerently
on bioethics issues. After all, even after high-proﬁle events fostered widespread agreement that something
should be done about cloning and gene therapy, Congress was unable to pass any legislation.158
156410 U.S. 959; 93 S. Ct. 1409; 35 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1973).
An additional consideration is that courts are likely to encounter a diﬃculty which they have faced in other science-related
contexts, namely, the “battle of the experts.” As long ago as the 1970s, a presidential advisory group convened by President
Ford issued a report which addressed the problem of how policy issues could be resolved when experts had divergent opinions.
The group proposed a “science court” which would supplement and assist regular courts, similar to the way magistrate courts
operate. The “science court” would conduct public adversary hearings, which would be moderated by three disinterested
referees. The “adversaries” would be scientists with diﬀerent points of view, while the “judges” would be scientists who were
appointed based on recommendations from scientiﬁc societies and other professional organizations. The judges would catalog
the points of agreement and disagreement and then suggest speciﬁc research projects to settle the areas of disagreement. See
Smith, supra note 31, at 107.
157Administrative Procedure Act § 553, 556-57.
158Congress’ futile eﬀorts to pass cloning legislation have been recounted in Section I above. When a relatively healthy,
18-year-old volunteer died during a gene therapy clinical trial at the University of Pennsylvania, there was extensive concern
52There are several reasons that Congress failed to act at these times, and these constraints are likely to
hamper Congress’ ability to set bioethics policy in the future. As discussed above, consensus on bioethical
issues is elusive under any circumstances, but particularly so in Congress’ politically charged environment;
furthermore, it is challenging to draft unambiguous legislative language which speciﬁcally proscribes certain
practices without chilling potentially beneﬁcial ones. According to one author’s assessment of Congress’
gridlock in 1997, “The current federal legislative stalemate over human cloning prohibitions exempliﬁes the
virtually impossible task of devising statutory language acceptable to both the scientiﬁc community and the
pro-life community.”159
In addition to these factors, Congress has so many responsibilities that its attention to bioethics policy is
prone to be waylaid at any time. For example, the full Senate had been considering cloning legislation when
the September 11th terrorist attacks occurred. Justiﬁably, the Senate set aside cloning to address more
pressing matters, but this type of spasmodic deliberation, which is intrinsic to Congress, is not conducive
to the prudent formation of bioethics policy. Congress’ hectic schedule also means that legislation may be
passed too hurriedly, without giving a fair hearing to all important considerations, and such rushed legislation
could end up being more harmful than helpful.160
that regulatory oversight had failed. Several inﬂuential legislators, including Senators Kennedy and Frist and Congressman
Waxman, threatened to act, but ultimately they did not. See Rainsbury, supra note 70, at 595.
159Rokosz, supra note 78, at 489.
160See, e.g., Chang Ai-Lien Natalie Soh, Early Days for Law on Ethical Problems in Research, The Singapore Straits Times,
Sept. 22, 2001, available in 2001 WL 26056933. As one member of Singapore’s Bioethics Advisory Committee commented,
“Legislation should be made only after the issues have been discussed publicly and a consensus reached on what should be
done.”
See also Reiss, supra note 102, at 91. “Such a consensus should be based on reason and democratic debate and take into account
long established practices of ethical reasoning... [C]onsensus should not be equated with majority voting. Consideration needs
to be given to the interests of minorities, particularly if they are especially aﬀected by the outcomes, and to those – such as
young children, the mentally inﬁrm, and non-humans – unable to participate in the decision-making process.”
53Another real challenge for Congress is that bioethics policy demands a degree of technical expertise which
requires eﬀort to attain and maintain. Although many bioethical questions are conducive to general un-
derstanding and debate, many other questions will be more opaque to most legislators, who do not have
backgrounds in the biological sciences. Because there are so many demands on legislators’ time, many will
not have the opportunity to fully grasp relevant technical details before they are asked to vote on legislation.
As one writer describes, this technical hurdle can make bioethics policy rather perplexing for legislators:
Here your senator faces the same diﬃculties as your bishop. Cloning is hard to understand, as is
stem cell research and xenotransplantation. Neither your senator nor your bishop is likely to be a
biologist and neither are the people closest to them likely to have much scientiﬁc expertise. But
when conscientious legislators look outside of their intimate circle of advisors for advice on cloning
and its regulation, they are likely to encounter the cacophony that I described previously. Their
scientiﬁc advisors will be long on technique and short on moral analysis, and their religious advisors
will argue among themselves on the correct morals and be as fuzzy on speciﬁcs as the legislators
themselves are.161
Also, given the high rate of turnover in the membership of Congress and its staﬀ, it is diﬃcult to envision
how bioethics-related knowledge can be accumulated eﬀectively by Congress as an institution, either by a
critical mass of legislators or within a relevant Congressional committee.
Finally, Congress may be a perilous place for bioethics policy because of the vagaries of political power
and the peculiarities of legislative procedure. Powerful individuals can play decisive roles in the fate of
legislation. For example, the chairperson of a committee has a heavy hand in determining what form a bill
takes and whether it will get out of committee for general ﬂoor debate. Similarly, the minority and majority
leaders in each chamber of Congress have considerable leverage to build or destroy support for a piece of
legislation. Like these individuals who have inordinate power, organized special interest groups can sway
the Congressional process to a degree that is disproportionate to the weight that should properly be given
to their interests. Furthermore, the legislative process can derail bioethics policy for reasons unrelated to its
54substantive merit. Disparate pieces of legislation are often cobbled together and consolidated in one large
bill. As a result, a bioethics portion of a bill may be subject to negotiation so that the entire package can
pass, or even if a majority agrees with a bioethics portion of a bill, it may be rejected because the overall
package was not compelling enough to pass.162
For all of these reasons, it seems unlikely that Congress will be able to produce thoughtful bioethics policies
on a timely, consistent basis. In the characteristically blunt words of Professor Richard Posner, “Waiting
for legislative blueprints to map out the perimeters of the New Biology is... an almost certain guarantee for
egregious delays and disappointments.”163
162Curt Anderson, Senate KOs Broad Gene Bias Measure, AP Online, June 29, 2000, available in 2000 WL 23361313. The
genetic privacy bill is an example of this dynamic. Following the announcement about the sequencing of the human genome,
there was a ﬂurry of concern about the discriminatory use of genetic information by employers and insurance companies. As
a result, several senators proposed measures which would limit the use of genetic information. These measures were proposed
as amendments to the annual appropriations bill for the Departments of Labor, Education, and Health and Human Services.
President Clinton threatened to veto the entire appropriations bill because of the bill’s overall spending level and a variety of
other reasons unrelated to the privacy provision.
163Smith, supra note 31, at 117-18.
55Where Congress has limitations, a regulatory agency has corresponding advan-
tages. A key beneﬁt of a regulatory agency is that it can respond more nimbly
to fast moving science. Once Congress passes a law, the law gathers an inertia
and presumptive legitimacy which raises the barriers to changing it. Although
Congress can build ﬂexibility into its laws through devices such as “sunset pro-
visions,” which trigger reconsideration after a certain period of time, this recon-
sideration is time-consuming and repeatedly exposes policy to the whims of the
legislative process. Although a regulatory agency must follow notice and com-
ment procedures to promulgate regulations, this process tends to be less arduous
than the legislative process.164 Moreover, an agency can promptly initiate modi-
ﬁcations to regulations when necessary. Although regulatory modiﬁcations may
also require notice and comment, this process is generally less torturous than
the legislative amendment process. This ﬂexibility is critically important when
initial regulations appear to be having unintended, undesirable eﬀects or when
circumstances change. With respect to the latter, it is instructive to remember
that practices which were once very controversial, such as organ transplants and
in vitro fertilization, have gained widespread acceptance over time.165 A bioethics
institution must be capable of adapting to these types of attitude shifts.
Another beneﬁt of a regulatory agency is that it can accumulate technical expertise. A bioethics agency
would undoubtedly be populated by several people with extensive scientiﬁc training, and others in the agency
who do not have such training would absorb the necessary knowledge over time. Relative to Congress, where
members must be re-elected to stay in oﬃce, the level of turnover at regulatory agencies is lower. As a result,
people within a regulatory agency can build broad and deep bases of knowledge. A regulatory agency also
gains expertise through its intimate oversight of a particular industry. It can gather extensive information
about what is happening “on the ground,” and if one believes that more information generally leads to better
policy, a regulatory agency is well suited to develop bioethics policy.
Finally, a regulatory agency may be more capable than Congress of protecting the privacy of participants
in the biotechnology industry. This consideration would be particularly relevant to private companies or
164See, e.g., Willgoos, supra note 86, at 122.
165Reiss, supra note 102, at 82.
56renegade scientists. The prospect of public disclosure will motivate parties to be secretive in order to preserve
competitive secrets, avoid moral outcry, or both.166Unfortunately, the most secretive parties are likely to be
the ones which warrant the most careful ethical scrutiny, so the ability to keep information conﬁdential is
important to engender as much disclosure as possible. Although regulatory agencies and Congress are both
government entities which are subject to FOIA disclosure requirements, a regulatory agency is generally
better able to protect information from widespread exposure. Most Congressional hearings are open to the
public and are a matter of public record. Although closed hearings are possible, it would be diﬃcult for a
biotechnology company to request one without immediately raising some eyebrows. In contrast, the ﬁndings
of a regulatory agency are not routinely published,167 and an agency could assure that information provided
for policy development purposes would not be identiﬁably disclosed.
As the preceding discussion indicates, there are many factors to consider in
conceiving of a novel bioethics institution. No institutional structure will be
perfect. Despite the strengths and virtues of any particular institution, it will
have weaknesses and imperfections as well. Therefore the most important point
is to formulate an institution as thoughtfully as possible, and then establish it as
soon as possible, so that it is in place and ready to address the ethical questions
raised by the next major biotechnological advance.
166Rainsbury, supra note 70, at 599. Describing trends in the gene therapy ﬁeld, Rainsbury notes:
The public nature of the RAC has had a salutary eﬀect in informing the public about the progress of gene therapy... Today,
gene therapy is in a transition period. The ﬁeld has shown enough promise to induce private ﬁrms to begin sponsoring studies.
If such investment is to be encouraged, however, regulators must guarantee investigators that proprietary information will be
treated conﬁdentially. Otherwise, competing ﬁrms will be able to free-ride on the substantial investment of pioneering ﬁrms,
deterring investment... [R]equiring public disclosure of all information submitted to FDA likely would have a chilling eﬀect on
such submissions.
167This statement refers to information that a bioethics agency might seek from private companies about what types of research
they are conducting in order to determine whether rulemaking is necessary. This type of information need not be published,
e.g., in the Federal Register. This statement does not refer to information which the agency can and should disclose, e.g.,
companies whose activities have violated established regulations.
57Section IV: A Proposal for an Institution Dedicated to the Development and Implementation
of Bioethics Policy
Taking the considerations from the previous sections into account, this section oﬀers a concrete proposal for
a bioethics policy institution called the Agency for the Genetic Technologies Community (AGTC).168 The
AGTC is a standing organization which can give sustained focus to bioethics issues,169 and it is exclusively
devoted to the development and implementation of bioethics policy. Its mission is two-fold: to provide a
politically neutral and inclusive forum for the debate of bioethical questions and to implement and enforce
bioethics policy. The AGTC’s structure mirrors its two-part mission. The deliberative element of the AGTC
is vested in a leadership council, which bears responsibility for facilitating discussions of bioethical issues
and crystallizing these discussions into regulations or legislative recommendations. Enforcement is carried
out by career staﬀ members of the AGTC.
The AGTC addresses several factors which have hampered more eﬀective resolution of bioethics issues thus
far. First, the AGTC shall serve as a focal point where diverse points of view can converge. As noted
previously, the parties in bioethical debates tend to have a hard time talking to each other. As one writer
describes:
168The word “community” in this name is intended to recognize the broad range of parties which have interests in bioethics
policy and which are represented within the institution. Although the acronym is not particularly elegant, it contains the same
initials as the four bases of the DNA sequence.
169OTA report, supra note 152, at 30-31. The OTA reported a widespread belief that ad hoc initiatives are the least desirable
way to address bioethical issues. Restarting ad hoc initiatives consumes valuable time, money, and personal energy, and
the knowledge and credibility that each initiative gathers is dissipated when it dissolves. By contrast, a standing body can
accumulate expertise and legitimacy and transfer these valuable assets from issue to issue. The OTA also noted that the
United States is unusual in its lack of a continuous bioethics organization. Most other countries with bioethics institutions have
established permanent ones. Id. at 29.
58It remains true... that as a sociological matter, it is the rare scientist who is equally at home in
scientiﬁc discourse and religious discourse when he or she is addressing the morality of a scientiﬁcally
feasible project. If is true, furthermore, as a conceptual and methodological matter, that it is only
with the greatest diﬃculty that scientiﬁc and religious thought mesh once we leave the plane of high
abstractions and descend to the level of concrete problems.170
The tremendous challenge of ﬁnding common vocabularies and assumptions will be ameliorated, to at least
some degree, by establishing the AGTC as a place where all of these parties interact on a continuous basis.
Moreover, the AGTC will bring order to the currently fragmented regulatory regime. As discussed above,
several diﬀerent agencies have – or claim to have – jurisdiction over certain bioethical issues, and these
ambiguities in the lines of responsibility are unwieldy. As the “owner” of bioethics issues, the AGTC clariﬁes
any confusion about responsibility or jurisdiction and minimizes duplication and inconsistency in the policy-
making process.171
Placement within the government
An institution’s placement within the government is a key determinant of its eﬀectiveness, and there are at
least two possibilities for the AGTC. One of the more obvious options is to tuck it into the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS). Since the NIH and FDA, which are components of HHS,172 already have
excellent reputations within the scientiﬁc and medical communities, and since there may be some synergies
between the AGTC and these agencies, it could be sensible to place the AGTC within HHS. This placement
would have several drawbacks, however. First, the AGTC may get buried in the vast HHS bureaucracy,
where potential “turf battles” and competition for resources among HHS agencies could hinder the AGTC’s
171The bioethical issues associated with any technologies which are currently within the jurisdiction of another agency should
be transferred to the AGTC. For example, stem cell guidelines, which are currently promulgated by the NIH, would become an
AGTC responsibility. Similarly, the RAC’s functions would be folded into the AGTC, and although the FDA could continue
to oversee the safety aspects of gene therapy experiments, the AGTC would have exclusive authority over the bioethical rules
for gene therapy.
172See <www.hhs.gov/about/orgchart.html> (visited Apr. 8, 2002) for an HHS organization chart.
59eﬀectiveness.173 Second, the AGTC may be perceived as a “techy” and scientiﬁcally oriented body like the
NIH, rather than the inclusive, multidisciplinary institution it is intended to be.
A more promising option is to set up the AGTC as an adjunct to Congress, similar to the Congressional
Budget Oﬃce (CBO)174 and General Accounting Oﬃce (GAO).175 These oﬃces were established by Congress
to provide independent and nonpartisan assessments to assist Congress with its legislative activities. Despite
their direct involvement with Congress, these oﬃces have maintained their political neutrality and have
established themselves as respected, credible sources of information and policy recommendations. Similarly,
the AGTC would provide bioethics information and policy recommendations to Congress. As an adjunct
agency, the AGTC would have ready access to the legislative process if and when bioethics laws are necessary,
yet it can still maintain the autonomy and credibility which are so vital to its mission.
Membership of the AGTC
The composition of the AGTC is another crucial factor in maintaining its autonomy and credibility. In
particular, the members of the leadership council must include a broad array of constituencies so that the
policies it develops will incorporate – and just as importantly, be perceived as incorporating – all salient
considerations. For similar reasons, the members must be adequately diverse along ethnic, gender, and geo-
graphic lines. As the OTA report indicated, “Diversity in race, ethnicity, gender, and professional experience
is a paramount factor in appointing commissioners and staﬀ. Ethics involves values, and a commission with
173For example, competition for scarce HHS resources was a factor in the decision to dismantle the RAC and fold it into the
FDA.
174See <www.cbo.gov> (visited Apr. 8, 2002). The Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO) was created in 1974 to provide Congress
with objective, timely, and nonpartisan analyses, information, and estimates needed for economic and budget decisions. The
CBO is a professional, nonpartisan organization and does not make policy recommendations, but rather presents Congress with
options to consider.
175See <www.gao.gov> (visited Apr. 8, 2002). The General Accounting Oﬃce (GAO), commonly called the investigative
arm of Congress or the Congressional “watchdog,” responds to Congressional requests for studies of the federal government’s
programs and expenditures. The GAO examines how the federal government spends taxpayer funds, advises Congress and the
heads of agencies about how to make government more eﬀective and responsible, evaluates federal programs, audits federal
expenditures, and issues legal opinions. It also recommends actions to improve government operations.
60monolithic membership or staﬃng cannot hope to adequately represent the diverse range of perspectives in
American society.”176
While inclusion is critical, the leadership council must also be kept to a manageable size. Using the NBAC
and Council on Bioethics as benchmarks, a size of ﬁfteen to twenty members seems to be reasonable. For
organizational purposes and in situations where one person needs to speak for the AGTC, it would be expe-
dient to designate one person as the chair of the leadership council. The chair shall be elected by the other
council members and serve a two-year term.
The next consideration is which ﬁelds should be represented on the leadership council.177One author proposes
an allocation of one-third government interests, one-third scientiﬁc community, and one-third ethicists, the-
ologians, economists, and representatives of “other disciplines that represent society’s many concerns.”178
For the NBAC, it was required by Executive Order that at least one member be selected from each of
the following ﬁve disciplines: philosophy/theology, law, social/behavioral science, medicine/allied health
professions, and biological research.179 Although the Council on Bioethics does not have such an explicit
requirement, these ﬁve ﬁelds are represented on the Council. The AGTC’s leadership council should un-
doubtedly include basic science, medicine, public health, law, ethics, philosophy, theology, and economics;
however, the council should also include representatives of biotechnology companies180 and patients. Pa-
176OTA report, supra note 152, at 34.
177Knowles, supra note 94, at 19-20. In explaining why multidisciplinary representation is crucial, Knowles states:
Not only does the lack of integrated ethical, scientiﬁc, and policy debates aﬀect the ethical background of regulatory responses,
but it also aﬀects the laws drafted under these circumstances. Such laws tend to be narrowly drafted and reactive, rather
than broadly drafted, dynamic, and capable of adapting to scientiﬁc advances that tend to follow quickly on the heels of one
another. There is scant recognition of any interaction between new and existing technologies in related ﬁelds [e.g., reproductive
and genetic technologies]... laws may be drafted too vaguely, broadly, or narrowly so as to inhibit the development of scientiﬁc
innovation.
178Greene, supra note 29, at 357.
179Exec. Order No. 13,137 (1999), available in <http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/nbac/ nbac extended.html> (visited Apr.
8, 2002). In §2, this order speciﬁed that at least three members should be selected from the general public to “bring[ ] to the
Commission expertise other than that listed.” It further provided that the number of scientist and non-scientist members should
be approximately equal and that close attention should be given to geographic distribution and ethnic and gender diversity.
180Many bioethicists believe that cutting-edge science is going to be done in private companies, not in public institutions
where federal funds can be controlled. As Arthur Caplan said, “A bioethics that is disconnected from industry is a bioethics
that ﬂies blind.” See Stolberg, supra note 35. The NBAC included some representatives of biotechnology companies, but the
Council on Bioethics does not.
61tient advocates were absent from previous bioethics commissions, and it is hard to imagine that balanced
and credible bioethics policy can be developed without their input. It may also be appropriate to include
one or two members from the legislative and regulatory communities to provide insights on the practical
implications of various policy alternatives. After all, the leadership council should not look like a think tank,
as the Council on Bioethics, which is populated almost entirely by professors, does. Rather, the leadership
council’s orientation should be academic and deliberative, yet simultaneously pragmatic and geared toward
implementation.181
To further ensure the AGTC’s autonomy and credibility, the process of appointing the leadership council
must be insulated from political partisanship as much as possible. One step is to accept nominations for the
leadership council from the public at large. Doing so would dampen the opportunity for political leaders to
use these positions as a way of thanking those who have supported them politically or of installing those who
will hew to their ideological agenda. From among these nominees, the members of the leadership council
will be chosen by a bipartisan group of Congressional leaders – the Speaker of the House, the President pro
tempore of the Senate, and the minority and majority leaders of the House and Senate.182 Since the AGTC
is an adjunct to Congress, and since the AGTC may make legislative recommendations to Congress, it is
sensible for Congressional leaders to pick the members of the leadership council. To prevent the council from
being inordinately shaped by the political landscape of any particular session of Congress, however, council
members shall serve staggered, four-year terms.183 As additional safeguards against partisanship, it could
181OTA report, supra note 152, at 34. The report recommended that a bioethics body should include both practitioners and
theoreticians.
182OTA report, supra note 152, at 35. The CBO Director is selected in a similar way. The Speaker of the House and the
President pro tempore of the Senate select the Director based on recommendations by the budget committees of both chambers
of Congress.
183The members of the NBAC served two-year terms, although several members remained on the Commission for several
terms. The members of the Council on Bioethics are slated to serve two-year terms. Members of previous bioethics commission,
e.g., the National Commission, served four-year terms. For the AGTC, four years seems to be a reasonable term for ensuring a
beneﬁcial amount of continuity without obligating members to serve for an excessively long time. See, e.g., OTA report, supra
note 152, at 35: “Infusing new ideas and personalities by limiting members’ terms carries some cost... Commission dynamics
62be mandated that no more than half of the council members can be from the same political party184 and
that members are removable only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in oﬃce.
Rule-making authority
To prevent the AGTC from becoming just another advisory commission or “debating society,” the leadership
council must have some rule-making authority. Given the nuances of bioethical issues and the dynamic
nature of scientiﬁc progress, the AGTC should have three types of authority. First, it can issue non-binding
guidelines. Second, it can draft and recommend legislation to Congress. Third, it can act as a regulatory
agency by promulgating and enforcing administrative rules. To implement any of these three measures, the
leadership council must muster a two-thirds vote. This two-thirds requirement seems to be more appropriate
than a simple majority because it is desirable to reach a meaningful degree of consensus on divisive bioethical
issues, and a stricter standard will push the leadership council to seek more common ground. Moreover,
the rules which emerge from the AGTC will be regarded more seriously because they have surmounted this
higher hurdle.
Non-binding guidelines, the “softest” type of action that the AGTC can take, are appropriate for nascent
developments where the trajectory of a technology and its ethical implications are not entirely clear. Non-
binding guidelines would outline general normative principles to guide research and development, and these
guidelines would also serve as notice that more speciﬁc regulations could follow in the future. An example
take some time to develop; overly short term lengths would strain the consensus building process.”
184The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights uses this type of measure to ensure political neutrality. See <www.usccr.gov> (visited
Apr. 8, 2002). The U.S. Civil Rights Commission is an independent, bipartisan, fact-ﬁnding agency established under the
Civil Rights Act of 1957. Its responsibilities are to investigate complaints of discrimination; study & collect information about
discrimination; analyze federal laws and policies; serve as a national clearinghouse for information about discrimination or
denial of equal protection of the laws; submit reports, ﬁndings, and recommendations to the President and Congress; and issue
public service announcements to discourage discrimination or denial of equal protection of the laws.
63of a situation where non-binding guidelines would be appropriate is genetic screening. Genetic screening
is currently used to detect embryos with dispositions for grave, incurable diseases; however, this technique
may be employed in the future for the ethically questionable purpose of screening embryos for traits such
as height and athletic ability. AGTC guidelines would serve the useful purpose of articulating the general
principle that screening technologies should be used for therapeutic, rather than elective, applications.
When a situation is serious enough to warrant a strong measure or when the
path of a technology has become more evident, the leadership council may deem
it appropriate to make legislative recommendations to Congress. For reasons
discussed previously, e.g., the inﬂexibility of statutory language, Congressional
action is most appropriate for marking the outer bounds of ethically proscribed
conduct. As expressed by one writer:
[T]hrough the law, our society does not attempt to agree upon all conduct which is ethical, and
all conduct which is unethical. Law performs a much narrower function. In the universe of ethics,
right and wrong behaviors lie along a spectrum, with ethically good or even ideal conduct at one
end and ethically bad behavior at the other end... Society often uses law to identify those behaviors
primarily at one end of the spectrum: those behaviors about which there is general agreement that
they are unethical, wrong, or unacceptable... But that leaves much conduct... simply not addressed
by law, and over which there may be signiﬁcant diﬀerences of opinion... it does not address the
ethical maximums.185
Human germline gene therapy is an example of a context where legislation may be suitable. Many scientists
have called for a presumptive ban on germline gene therapy to mark a strong ethical line. As Eric Lander,
director of the genome center at MIT, recommends:
64I would have... an absolute ban in place on human germline gene therapy. Not because I think for
sure we should never cross that threshold, but because I think that it is such a fateful threshold to
cross that I’d like society to have to rebut that presumption someday, to have to repeal a ban when
it thought it was time to ever try something like that.186
The leadership council’s involvement in recommending and drafting legislation could increase the chances
that Congress will be able to pass bioethics laws. As discussed above, the drafting of appropriate language
has been a bottleneck during previous attempts to legislate. Although the language in any AGTC proposal
will – and should – encounter challenges and negotiations in Congress, an AGTC proposal may shortcut
enough political wrangling to prevent the legislative process from being stymied at the drafting stage.187
Ideally, the imprimatur of the AGTC would also have a persuasive inﬂuence on the legislative process. If the
AGTC successfully establishes its credibility as a source of thoughtful, nonpartisan, and fact-based bioethics
policies, legislators are likely to show more deference to AGTC recommendations. As a result, bioethics
legislation may have a better chance of passing through Congress.
The third type of authority that the AGTC should have is a regulatory body’s ability to promulgate and
enforce administrative rules. These rules would be most appropriate in situations where a speciﬁc kind of
research and development is considered to be ethically permissible, but only with certain restrictions or
safeguards. For example, embryonic stem cell research is an area where regulation is proper because an
outright legislative ban would be too restrictive, whereas non-binding guidelines would not be restrictive
enough. Like FDA regulations, AGTC regulations would apply to both public and private entities, and
the AGTC should be empowered to enforce them on a case-by-case basis. Case-by-case review will not only
ensure adherence with these rules, but also enable AGTC to craft better regulations. As one author explains,
187OTA report, supra note 152, at 27: “Government-sanctioned commissions allow debates about contentious issues to go
forward in a somewhat less politicized way than is possible on the ﬂoors of Congress... [they] provide a vehicle to handle
issues that are amenable to consensus building... [and] can be an opportunity to create the environment in which political
action becomes possible by gathering policy relevant information and injecting it directly into the policy matrix. In doing so,
commissions can often consider controversial issues independent of the regular political process and its constraints.”
65the RAC’s analysis of individual cases enhanced its eﬀectiveness as a deliberative body:
Unlike other federal bioethics advisory committees, the RAC involved itself directly in the review
of speciﬁc human gene therapy experiments. Rather than debate grand propositions about human
dignity, RAC meetings got down to the nitty-gritty of the scientiﬁc details for the reviewed protocols.
Although this often lent a ‘schizophrenic’ quality to meetings, with lay members of the RAC largely
unable to participate in technical discussions, it did focus attention on the real costs and beneﬁts of
proceeding with a controversial science. This appears to have had [ ] positive consequences...
[C]ase-by-case evaluation revealed the human interests at stake in the enterprise. It is one
thing to say in the abstract that a certain class of human clinical trials is oﬀ-limits; it is quite another
to reject a treatment for which desperate volunteers have already lined up.188
Since rules are toothless without eﬀective enforcement, the AGTC must have enforcement capabilities, staﬀ,
and resources. At a minimum, the AGTC should establish an approval process for relevant research and
development protocols, similar to that of the FDA or the initial incarnation of the RAC.189 If necessary, the
AGTC may also impose reporting obligations and oversight committees; however, these measures should be
used only sparingly to avoid excessively onerous bureaucratic requirements. Finally, the AGTC should be
authorized to impose civil and criminal sanctions for violations of its rules.
AGTC responsibilities
In addition to developing and enforcing rules, the AGTC shall fulﬁll several other important responsibilities.
More speciﬁcally, the AGTC will gather and distribute information, sponsor discussion forums, educate the
general public, and act as the primary liaison to the global bioethics community. These responsibilities will
be carried out primarily by AGTC staﬀ, but with the guidance and participation of the leadership council.
•
Gather and distribute information
189In some instances, the AGTC may want to explore the feasibility of coordinating its approval process with the FDA’s to
minimize the amount of additional paperwork for researchers and biotechnology companies.
66A crucial function of the AGTC is to be the authoritative source of information related to bioethics. This
role will lend a tremendous amount of credibility to the AGTC as an organization and to the policies it
develops. Also, if bioethics policy is to become less crisis-driven and more proactive,190 the AGTC must
continually update its awareness of biotechnological developments. It is critical that the AGTC be eﬀective
at collecting information about activities in both the public and private sectors.191 Although private parties
are generally hesitant to come forward with information about their activities, they may be more forthcoming
if the AGTC ensures conﬁdentiality and if they believe that the information gathering is “fair” – i.e., that
all other parties are also reporting their activities. Ironically, private actors may feel most compelled to
cooperate with the AGTC if the AGTC successfully establishes itself as an eﬀective regulatory body. As one
writer notes:
[N]on-funded ﬁrms or institutions are likely to seek some sort of regulatory imprimatur if they are
at the vanguard of ethics and technology. An easy way to establish public conﬁdence in a product
is to have it cleared by a trusted institution... In addition to positive public relations, non-federally-
funded institutions may submit voluntarily to [ ] review in order to shield themselves from liability
in the event that something untoward happens in the course of the clinical trial. Although such
a regulatory compliance defense probably would not be dispositive, it certainly would be evidence
that the investigators had behaved cautiously and prudently.192
As another aspect of its role as a repository of information, the AGTC should also disseminate information.
Although the AGTC must be cautious to avoid disclosing any conﬁdential information, it could publicly
distribute useful baseline information, e.g., an annual report or quarterly fact sheet which contains general
ﬁndings about biotechnological developments, as well as what the AGTC has done – or plans to do –
about them. In addition, the AGTC should set up an archive, with a small staﬀ of librarians, to serve
190Knowles, supra note 94, at 22. As Knowles describes, one of the weaknesses of current bioethics policy is its reactive
tendency: “New developments take us by surprise because we are not discussing these issues prospectively. We respond by
using law in a reactive, ad hoc manner, not anticipating that we may in fact ultimately restrict scientiﬁc progress, including
applications from which many may beneﬁt.”
191As discussed above, the balance of publicly vs. privately funded research has increasingly tilted toward the private side.
See, e.g., Fukuyama, supra note 21. Until the early 1990s, most biomedical research was funded through the NIH or other
federal agencies. See also Brave, supra note 19. As Caplan predicts, “I think the genetic revolution is going to be privatized
and going to be a business. It is simply inevitable.”
67as a reliable source of more detailed information for parties involved with bioethics issues, e.g., legislators,
lawyers, biotechnology companies, journalists.
•
Sponsor discussion forums
To promote open, interdisciplinary discussion of bioethical issues, the AGTC shall sponsor public conferences
at least once a year, but more frequently if appropriate. The leadership council will determine a salient topic
or set of topics for each conference, and each member of the leadership council will be responsible for ensuring
that the major interest groups in his or her substantive area send representatives to the conference. The
proceedings of each conference will be recorded and placed in the public record. Although conferences
with some discussion of bioethical issues are already being held, the AGTC conferences are still useful
and necessary. First, these conferences will reliably occur on a regular basis, and their agenda will be
exclusively dedicated to bioethical issues. Also, because these conferences are AGTC-sponsored, they are
likely to draw a broader group of participants than conferences hosted by more specialized groups, such as
an industry association or religious organization. Finally, with the legitimacy of the AGTC behind them,
these conferences are likely to become the primary forum for the bioethics community – i.e., a place where
leaders in bioethics can expect to interact and where inﬂuential policy discussions will occur.
•
Educate the general public about bioethical issues
Another essential duty of the AGTC is to ensure that the general public is suﬃciently informed to develop
thoughtful opinions about bioethical issues. There are several reasons to devote AGTC resources to this
68task. First, democratic values require the public to be aware of issues which could aﬀect them directly and
intimately. As Dr. Sydney Brenner, Distinguished Professor at the Salk Institute of Biological Studies and
the “father of molecular genetics,” asserts, “The public needs to be involved. They are part of the issues.”193
As another writer argues, “If we wish to stand by our democratic belief in the right of people to participate
in choosing their destiny, the most pressing task is to educate the public and its elected representatives.”194
There are also practical advantages to a better-informed public. A policy developed with meaningful public
input is likely to be a better policy. For example, during Oregon’s eﬀort to prioritize health services for
Medicaid funding, the Oregon Health Services Committee proposed an initial ranking based primarily on
cost-beneﬁt calculations. After public criticism arose, the Committee held open meetings to elicit public
comments. Based on these comments, the Committee revised the list, and the revised list was widely
acknowledged to be a better one.195
Finally, if the public is not well informed, bioethical issues are prone to be discussed in sensationalized
terms. With many divisive social issues, attention-grabbing slogans, images, and symbols tend to deﬁne the
terms of debate, and since science-related issues can easily be misunderstood, the chances of emotionally-
driven, exaggerated bioethics discourse are very high. Consider, for example, the strategy of Dr. Leon
Kass, President Bush’s personal bioethics adviser and chair of the Council on Bioethics. Although Dr. Kass
has acknowledged that the actual demand for human reproductive cloning is quite low, he has explicitly
indicated that he plans to use the reproductive cloning issue as a “unique practical opportunity” to raise the
“impending prospects of germline genetic or other eugenic practices.”196 As one assessed:
193Soh, supra note 160.
194Brave, supra note 19.
195Smith, supra note 31, at 103.
196Brave, supra note 19.
69Kass invoked the brave new world image to recommend a ban on embryo cloning, even cloning for
research purposes... [the] political calculation, explicitly expounded by Kass and others, is that by
focusing on as unpopular a prospect as human cloning, they can seize control of critical portions of
the biomedical agenda, constrict its inquiries, alter the pace of biotech developments and provide a
cautionary pause during which more extensive, global prohibitions can be put into place.197
Kass’ position may not be wrong, but public opinion must be shaped by facts, rather than intentionally
distorted scenarios. As one writer comments, “[I]t seems unlikely that cloning will be used by dictators to
perpetuate themselves, or to produce a warrior class to serve the purposes of the state or their own demented
ends. Our most farfetched fears should not drive policy making.”198
Experience shows that greater public awareness can moderate sensationalism. As discussed above, the
openness of the RAC contributed to the transition from alarmist thinking about an “Andromeda strain” to
general acceptance of gene therapy. In Singapore, the plan to develop biomedical research guidelines includes
a series of public forums intended to inform the public and thereby prevent dialogue from being “dictated
by sensationalism and worst-case premises.”199
Although it is nearly impossible to deﬁne what it means for the general public to be suﬃciently informed, it
is possible to set certain parameters. For example, it would be unnecessary for the average American to be
conversant in the intricate technical details of cloning procedures, but it would be desirable for the average
American to be aware of three or four basic distinctions between therapeutic and reproductive cloning. The
AGTC is not obligated to transform all Americans into scientists, but part of its job should be to distill
essential scientiﬁc background information into plain-language explanations which are comprehensible to
non-scientists.
Furthermore, the AGTC should explore ways of reaching the public with this information. At a minimum,
the AGTC can post this information on a website and establish working relationships with major media
198Solomon, supra note 121, at 660.
199Soh, supra note 160, quoting the director of medical services at the Singapore Ministry of Health.
70organizations; however, the AGTC should also explore more creative methods, e.g., oﬀering these materials
to schools for integration into classroom discussion, sponsoring public service announcements. At the same
time, the AGTC must handle its public education role with care. In its diligent eﬀorts to inform the public,
the AGTC must be careful to avoid the perception that it is promoting a particular point of view.
•
Serve as the primary point of contact with other countries
The AGTC shall also be the United States’ liaison with the international community on bioethics issues. As
discussed above, concerted international action may be necessary to proscribe certain practices eﬀectively,
and the United States is in a position to play a unique role in any global regulatory eﬀort. Aside from any
leadership obligation, however, it would be valuable for the AGTC to monitor what is happening interna-
tionally because other countries’ actions oﬀer a perspective on steps that might be appropriate domestically.
For example, a survey of cloning policies around the world demonstrates that other nations have acted more
quickly than the United States in banning human reproductive cloning. The United Kingdom was early to
prohibit the practice, 200 and since then many other European countries have endorsed a Council of Europe
treaty which bans “any intervention seeking to create a human being genetically identical to another human
being, whether living or dead.”201 Viewing this treaty as too lax, Germany abides by a stricter measure
which bans research on all human embryos.202 Outside of Europe, Israel established a ﬁve-year ban on
human cloning at the end of 1998. Japan has also banned human cloning and has taken the additional step
of establishing a special committee to regulate research which involves techniques that border on human
200Human cloning prohibitions were included in the 1990 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act.
20136 I.L.M. 1415 (1997), Council of Europe: Draft Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine
on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings. Signatories include Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy,
Latvia, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Moldova, Norway, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey.
202Greene, supra note 29, at 354. Germany’s strict policy may reﬂect the legacy of Nazi eugenic eﬀorts.
71cloning.
Most countries tend to be more permissive toward stem cell research. The United Kingdom recently lib-
eralized its strict regulations to permit the development and use of stem cells from human embryos. This
change in policy was motivated by the desire not to hamper research which could lead to better treatments
for many serious diseases.203 Elsewhere in Europe, the Council of Europe treaty mentioned above does not
rule out stem cell research, and Sweden and Finland allow research on embryos up to 22 days old. India
and China have no restrictions at all. In contrast, embryonic stem cell research is prohibited in Ireland,
where an unborn child is considered to be constitutionally equivalent to its mother.204 Brazil and most
Latin American countries have also banned it, and France and Germany currently do not allow it but are in
the process of reconsidering their laws.205
As this brief overview indicates, other nations’ bioethical policies are heterogeneous and ﬂuid, and changes
are inevitable as science continues to advance. China, for example, already anticipates that some regulation
may be necessary. According to a spokesman at the Ministry of Science and Technology, “We hope that our
scientists will make breakthroughs in their research. But we don’t want to see any negative impact that could
result from rushing forward blindly... The government is considering new laws, but it isn’t clear when they
might be enacted.”206 The AGTC is the logical place to track developments in international regulations,
assess any implications for the United States’ domestic policies, and represent the United States in global
bioethics discussions.
203In the U.K., the regulation of stem cell research has grown from the regulatory framework for assisted reproductive tech-
nologies. There are two government organizations with jurisdiction over this area: The Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Authority (HFEA), which oversees developments in fertilization and genetic procedures; and The Human Genetics Advisory
Commission (HGAC), a government-sponsored think-tank. When the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act was initially
passed, therapeutic cloning was not considered to be an acceptable purpose for embryo research. As science advanced, HFEA
and HGAC revisited the policy and after extensive debate, recommended that Parliament vote to allow the cloning of human
embryos for the derivation of stem cells. See Knowles, supra note 94, at 20-21.
204The Stem Cell Debate, supra note 103.
205Id.
206Leggett and Regalado, supra note 16.
72Conclusion
The time has come to establish a permanent government institution dedicated to bioethics issues. This call is
not new; in fact, a similar call was voiced as long ago as the early 1980s.207 Now, however, the time has really
come. The remarkable, swift progress of biomedical science promises to improve human life in unprecedented
ways, but it also raises moral and philosophical questions of unprecedented diﬃculty. Events during the last
ﬁve years, from the cloning of Dolly to the debate over embryonic stem cell research, have provided a glimpse
of how contentious these bioethical issues can be, and the eﬀorts to address these developments have been
fragmented, reactive, and generally ineﬀective. Before the wave of “genomic power and knowledge”208 arrives
in earnest, these bioethical issues must be considered and addressed in a systematic, proactive, and eﬀective
way.
The AGTC is an institution which would do so. Its structure, capabilities, and responsibilities are designed
to facilitate the development and implementation of sensible and consensus-based policies. Although the
strength of market forces, the relentless progress of science, and the heterogeneity of moral views will make
ethical control of biotechnology very challenging, it is possible. The establishment of a (long over)due process
for the development of bioethics policy is the crucial ﬁrst step toward meeting this challenge.
207OTA report, supra note 152, at 25.
208See supra note 146.
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